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Abstract
I present a thesis in three chapters in the broad field of Applied Macroeconomics.
The first chapter is an empirical investigation into the “granular hypothesis” - the hy-
pothesis that shocks to extremely large firms can have aggregate economic consequences.
Identifying this channel is nontrivial as it may be the case that large firms respond more
to aggregate shocks than most firms. I present a new way to identify true firm-level
shocks by looking at stock price movements around the times that firms release financial
information. I argue such movements reflect firm-specific, rather than aggregate infor-
mation. Using a measure of firm shocks recovered using this information suggests that
the importance of such shocks for aggregate economic outcomes has been overestimated
by previous work in the literature.
A good univariate representation of US GDP is a random walk with drift. The second
chapter shows that nonetheless US recessions have been associated with predictable
short-term recoveries with relatively small changes in long-term GDP forecasts. To
detect these predictable changes, it is important to use a multivariate time series model.
We discuss reasons why univariate representations can miss key characteristics of the
underlying variable such as predictability, especially during recessions.
The third chapter develops a general equilibrium model to investigate the macroeco-
nomic consequences of liquidity regulation, a form of regulation which was strengthened
substantially after the 2008 financial crisis. The model is used to identify two separate
channels through which liquidity regulation can affect the cost of capital: the “crowding
out” and “financial repression” channels. In the absence of these, I establish a neutrality
result in which liquidity regulation does not affect the wider economy. The principal pol-
icy implication of this chapter is that regulators should not count safe assets which they
require banks to hold for liquidity purposes against bank capital requirements.
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Introduction
This thesis consists of three chapters which fall within the broad field of applied macroe-
conomics. The first and third chapters focus on investigating the importance of individual
firms or sectors on aggregate fluctuations. One implication of the fact that many differ-
ent firms or sectors can matter for the aggregate economy is that empirical models of
the latter need to be sufficiently complex to capture rich dynamics such heterogeneity
would imply. The second chapter explores this point.
The first chapter focuses on the importance of the very largest firms, which, as pointed
out by Gabaix (2011) in principal can explain aggregate fluctuations due to their size.
In a “big picture” sense such shocks could provide a microfounded explanation for Total
Factor Productivity (TFP) shocks, which have remained a staple of modern macroeco-
nomic models even though it is hard to identify examples of such shocks (as argued, for
instance, by Summers (1986)). While the theoretical possibility that such shocks are
quantitatively important comes from the firm size distribution, the empirical challenge
has always been distinguishing true firm-level shocks from aggregate shocks. It is clearly
not sufficient to note that the very largest firms are more cyclical than the average firm,
as this is consistent either with the hypothesis that large firms drive the business cycle
or with the hypothesis that large firms are more sensitive to the business cycle than the
average firm. For example, in the US economy (the economy I study in Chapter One)
the largest firms throughout a large part of the post war period were Car Manufacturers,
namely General Motors and Ford. There are good reasons to think that Car Manu-
facturers are more sensitive to aggregate economic conditions than other companies –
cars are a consumer durable, and all such goods are typically very cyclical as households
postpone purchasing them during recessions. To overcome this key empirical challenge
I use variation in firm stock prices in daily intervals around when firms release financial
information (typically quarterly earnings results) which I argue (both a priori and using
suggestive evidence regarding the behaviour of stock prices of different subsets of firms)
contains firm-level information but not aggregate information. I then use this variation
to create a measure of firm shocks which should be “clean” of aggregate information and
examine how aggregate output and productivity respond to this measure of aggregate
shocks relative to the existing measures in the literature.
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While the first chapter focuses on firms which are distinguished by their size, the third
chapter focuses on a sector – financial intermediation – which is distinguished because of
its unique function. This chapter investigates the consequences of liquidity regulation on
the cost of capital for productive firms and hence aggregate output. The model I develop
identifies two channels through which liquidity regulation can raise the cost of capital,
which I term the “crowding out” and “financial repression” channels. I demonstrate that
in the absence of these channels, a neutrality result exists where financial intermediaries
are indifferent about holding any amount of liquid assets and so liquidity regulation has
no impact. I also calibrate my model to US data and quantitatively assess the impact
that liquidity regulation can have on aggregate output, both in the steady state and
during a transition period after a policy change which increases liquidity requirements.
The principal policy recommendation from this work is that if financial intermediaries
are required to hold liquid assets by regulatory bodies, these should not count towards
capital requirements, which they do under a simple “leverage ratio” which have been
introduced to supplement risk-weight based capital requirements since the 2008 financial
crisis.
One implication of these chapters is that simple time series models are unlikely to be rich
enough to capture the full dynamics of the macroeconomy, as many different shocks in
principal can affect the economy. Campbell and Mankiw (1987) noted that a random walk
with drift is a good representation of US GDP, which implies that any fall in GDP would
be expected to be permanent relative to a pre-recession growth path. In this chapter
we demonstrate that many US recessions are associated with predictable recoveries, but
only if the econometrician uses a multivariate model. The reason for this is that GDP
is a sum of stationary and nonstationary components. As such, the correct univariate
specification of GDP would indicate that it is nonstationary, which would indicate that
a shock to this model would imply that GDP would fall permanently. However any
shock to a stationary component would imply predictable future changes in GDP, which
would not be captured by a univariate representation. We investigate whether this point
matters in US and UK data, and demonstrate that it does. We find that in recessions a
simple multivariate model typically outperforms its univariate counterpart, though there
is no discernible difference in normal times.
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Chapter 1
Assessing the Granular Hypothesis
with High Frequency Financial
Information
1.1 Introduction
What are the shocks which drive business cycle fluctuations? In many business cycle
models, shocks to Total Factor Productivity (TFP) are important. But such shocks do
not have a ready interpretation, nor counterpart in the data. This missing element has
meant that some, such as Summers (1986) have questioned the notion that such shocks
are truly the source of business cycle fluctuations. More recently, Chari et al. (2007)
treat a series of exogenous TFP recovered from a prototype business cycle framework as
a reduced form “wedge” rather than a series of structural innovations.
If part of these wedges truly are structural, one possible interpretation is that they are
the sum of productivity shocks to either firms or sectors. It is easier to conceptualise
what a productivity shock might look like at the level of a firm than it is for the economy
as a whole. One obvious candidate is variation in the firm-level adoption of new technol-
ogy or production processes. Another related explanation would recognise that running
a firm is a complex task, and so mistakes by firm management are possible (and can lead
14
to both positive and negative productivity changes in firm productivity).1 However, as
there are many firms, the possibility that firm-level shocks might quantitatively explain
aggregate fluctuations was discounted until recently. But in an influential paper, Gabaix
(2011) argued that in principle shocks to the largest firms could explain a sizeable frac-
tion of aggregate fluctuations in output and productivity. This is because the firm-size
distribution in practice is sufficiently fat tailed that the effect of firm shocks decays much
more slowly with the number of firms N than one would normally expect if we were able
to apply a standard central limit theorem.2
The contribution of this paper is to introduce a novel way of identifying firm-level shocks.
Distinguishing aggregate and firm-level shocks is non-trivial as the effect of the former
can vary over firms, while shocks to large firms might affect other firms contemporane-
ously through either input-output linkages or market prices. I attempt to deal with this
problem by using high frequency information on firm stock prices around the time that a
firms releases their quarterly earnings reports. I argue that the movement of firm stock
prices at this time is (i) correlated with the productivity shock which relates to the firm
in question, and (ii) uncorrelated with any aggregate shock process. Given these two
assumptions, I estimate a collection of VARs which contain both firm and aggregate in-
formation. I use the external proxy methodology proposed by Stock and Watson (2012)
and Mertens and Ravn (2013) to obtain estimates of firm shocks. I then attempt to
quantify the aggregate consequences of these shocks in practice using the same method
as Gabaix (2011). I find that his original results considerably overstate the importance
of such shocks relative to my measure.
This method contrasts with the two principal existing approaches in the literature. The
first, performed by Gabaix (2011) simply used the (equally-weighted) firm productivity
growth rate as a measure of the aggregate shock, and found that firm shocks appear to
explain a large share of aggregate fluctuations. However, this ignores the possibility that
larger firms might be more (or less) sensitive to aggregate shocks than the average firm.
More recently, Stella (2015) has applied a factor model approach first developed at the
1The idea that firm managers can make mistakes seems at least as plausible as the idea that monetary
policy makers’ mistakes are the source of monetary policy shocks, which is one story used to justify the
existence of the latter.
2Key in this is that granular shocks truly apply at the firm level, rather than (say) at the plant level.
This is important as the former cannot be diversified by increasing the size of the firm. In this, appealing
to managerial decisions or mistakes seems a natural source of firm-level productivity variation.
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sectoral level by Foerster et al. (2011) to firms, an approach which can accomodate the
different sensitivity of firms to aggregate shocks. This work is an important contribution
to the empirical debate, and the results suggest that a very small fraction of aggregate
fluctuations come from true granular shocks. However, this approach relies on both
a number of strong theoretical assumptions and accurate data on input-output links
between firms: without these, granular shocks can be misattributed as aggregate shocks.
Unfortunately, data on network links between firms is highly incomplete at the firm
level.
Aside from being related to the literature on granular business cycles, this paper is
related to attempts to recover estimates of other fundamental economic shocks. There is
a long literature attempting to do this for many other types of shock, including Romer
and Romer (1989), Romer and Romer (2004) in the case of monetary policy shocks;
Blanchard et al. (2002), Ramey (2011) and Mertens and Ravn (2013) for fiscal shocks
and Kilian (2009) for shocks from the oil market, among many others. To my knowledge
this is the first paper to attempt to apply the methodology common in these areas to
examining the importance of firm-level shocks.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the literature. Section 1.3 sets out
a standard business cycle model which I use to examine previous attempts to estimate
firm shocks and to motivate my own emprical work. Section 1.4 discusses the data, while
sections 1.5 and 1.6 discuss the firm and aggregate results. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
There is a long literature on whether idiosyncratic shocks to either firms or sectors can be
large enough to explain a nontrivial quantity of aggregate fluctuations. Early important
theoretical contributions include Long and Plosser (1983) and Jovanovic (1987). How-
ever, in many models, getting sectoral shocks to be quantitatively important relied on
imposing only a small number of sectors.3 The reason for this is standard: assuming that
idiosyncratic shocks are distributed according to a “typical” (non-fat tailed) distribution,
3Gabaix (2011) argues that Long and Plosser (1983) use such a small number of sectors such that
these shocks are, in effect “mini-aggregate” shocks
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with N firms (or sectors) the importance of idiosyncratic shocks to overall volatility will
diminish quickly as N grows due to a central limit theorem.
Gabaix (2011) argued that shocks to firms could be important for aggregate fluctuations
even if the number of firms, N , is large. The essence of his argument is that firm size
follows a power law distribution, and so shocks to the very largest firms might have a
quantitatively important effect on economic aggregates. More precisely, the volatility of
a sum of N independent and identially distributed Normal shocks declines at rate N−
1
2 ,
while the volatility of the sum of N i.i.d. shocks distributed according to Zipf’s law
declines at rate ln(N). He also presents some empirical evidence, based on demeaning
the growth rates of large firms, that shocks to large firms are important. Carvalho and
Grassi (2015) extend this logic by altering the heterogenous firm framework of Hopenhayn
(1992) to allow for very large firms, and for shocks to large firms to dampen firm-level
shocks. Calibrating their measure of firm shocks using firm sales data, and matching the
firm size distribution in the US they are able to quantitatively explain around a quarter
of aggregate fluctuations just with firm-level shocks.
Gabaix (2011)’s striking empirical results rely on a number of simplifications. First, his
setup ignores the possibility that firms may vary in their response to aggregate growth.
If large firms are more cyclical than the average firm, his “granular residual” would
tend to overstate the importance of firm level shocks, as some of the reaction of large
firms to aggregate fluctuations would be mis-recorded as firm level shocks. Conversely,
the opposite would be true if large firms were less cyclical than the average firm. In
addition, his empirical measure uses the growth rate in the sales to employee ratio as the
measure of firm productivity, rather than value added, which would be a more typical
way to measure firm TFP.
These results have been assessed in a number of other empirical studies. di Giovanni
et al. (2014) use a panel of large French firms with detailed data on inter-firm linkages and
find that firm-level shocks matter as much as aggregate shocks for aggregate fluctuations
in France, with approximately one quarter of the effects of firm level shocks coming from
direct effects, and the remaining three-quarters from input-output linkages. However,
due to the relatively short time dimension of their panel, they are forced to assume (as
with Gabaix (2011)) that all firms respond symmetrically to aggregate fluctuations.
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An alternative approach is to use a dynamic factor model with a sufficiently long time
dimension which allows the loadings on the aggregate factor to vary across firms. An
important contribution was made by Stella (2015) who adapts the method of Foerster
et al. (2011) to do this on a panel of 500 large US firms using quarterly Compustat data.
The factor model approach requires that the econometrician knows how shocks to firm i
affect all other firms to allow the factor model to be able to distinguish firm and aggregate
shocks. In the model developed by Foerster et al. (2011), such spillovers can occur
through network links between firms and accounting for these is important in performing
the decomposition of productivity. Stella (2015) uses the Compustat Historical Customer
Segments database to construct firm linkages. As he notes, however, this database
likely understates the true input-output linkages across firms as it only records “major
customers” (those customers accounting for more than 10% of firm revenue), and the low
estimated input shares of such links (the calibrated intermediate-input shares of firms in
his sample has a mean of 0.02 and a median “close to” zero) also may indicate that some
input-output links are missing.
Aside from data problems, the structural setup of Foerster et al. (2011) might also be
overly restrictive when quantifying the importance of firm shocks. Atalay (2014) argues
that assuming that intermediate inputs enter in a Cobb-Douglas production function
(i.e. with a unitary elasticity of substitution) understates the importance of sectoral
shocks. He argues that the inputs provided by different sectors have an elasticity of
substitution with the output of other sectors far below 1 (typically between 0.2 to 0.4)
which dramatically increases the fraction of aggregate output fluctuations which can be
accounted for by sectoral shocks. It is not clear whether this result holds when considering
firms, rather than sectors (indeed, firms with competitors in the same sector have close
substitutes by definition, which might mean that the elasticity of substitution is greater
than 1).
Practice in the existing granular literature is that the productivity growth of firms is
typically measured using sales.4 In addition to such measures, I construct a measure
of firm-level TFP growth using Compustat data in line with the method proposed by
Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014) as a robustness check.
4Gabaix (2011) uses the growth of the ratio of sales to employees and Stella (2015) uses the growth
rate of sales alone.
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1.3 Framework
This section first outlines a simple model which will be useful to structure thinking
about my emprical work. I then examine existing empirical methods in the literature
which attempt to recover a measure of firm shocks through the lens of this model, before
explaining my empirical strategy.
1.3.1 Model
The model consists of a continuum of households, which supply labour and consume
N × S varieties of consumption goods, each produced by a different firm.
Household
The household supplies labour to firms and receives any profit, which are spent on N
varieties of consumption goods from each of S sectors:
max
{cist,lt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt(u(Ct)− v(Lt)),
subject to:
Ct =
( S∑
s=1
N∑
i=1
ν
1
ε
isc
ε−1
ε
ist
) ε
ε−1
, (1.1)
S∑
s=1
N∑
i=1
pitcit = wtLt + Πt, (1.2)
where
∑S
s=1
∑N
i=1 νis = 1. The household’s first order conditions are standard:
cist = vis
(
pist
Pt
)−ε
Ct, and (1.3)
v′(Lt)
u′(Ct)
= wt, (1.4)
where
Pt =
(∑
s
∑
i
νisp
1−ε
ist
) 1
1−ε
. (1.5)
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Firms
Firms choose labour input to maximise profits subject to their downward sloping demand
curve and taking wages as given:
max
cist,nist,pist
piist = pistzistn
α
ist − wtnist, (1.6)
subject to:
cist = zistn
α
ist, (1.7)
zist = λsift + γsifst + uist, (1.8)
and the demand curve implied by (1.3). Note that the firm’s productivity follows a factor
structure, where the factor loading λis measures the firm specific response to aggregate
shocks ft, γis measures the firm response to a process fst which only affects firms in sector
s, and uist is the idiosyncratic firm-specific component of productivity.5 The firm’s first
order condition is
wt +
∂wt
∂nist
nist = zist
(∂pist
∂cist
∂cist
∂nist
nαist + pistαnist
α−1), (1.9)
where the marginal cost of production (on the left-hand side of this expression) is in-
creasing in nist while the marginal revenue (right-hand side) is decreasing both because
of the effect of increased supply on both prices (first term) and the marginal product of
labour at a given price (second term). Again, this is standard except for the fact that I
allow for “large” firms in that the choice of nist may affect aggregate wages.
Market clearing implies that Lt =
∑S
s=1
∑N
i=1 nist, and the representative household
receives the profit that all firms make: Πt =
∑S
s=1
∑N
i=1 piist.
5One possibility not discussed in the literature is a time varying factor loading:
zist = λistft + γsifst + uist
= λ¯isft + γsifst + {(λist − λ¯is)ft + uist},
where the “firm shock” (now contained in braces) has a slope component (depending on the aggregate
factor) as well as a level component. It is reasonable to interpret a shock to λist as a firm (rather than
an aggregate) shock, as it affects the productivity of firm i in sector s without directly influencing the
productivity of any other firm. In practice accomodating such a specification would be computationally
prohibitive in a factor model approach. In the external proxy approch detailed in section 1.3.4 the proxy
would simply be correlated with the term in braces and uncorrelated with ft.
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Notice that firms are technologically symmetric, and variations in firm size come from
variations in taste (i.e. νis). Firms which produce goods with a high νis face higher
relative prices and hence employ more labour. Idiosyncratic shocks to these large firms
uist will have a larger effect on total output than the equivalent shocks for smaller firms,
and following the argument of Hulten (1978) discussed in Section 1.3.4, the effect of each
shock on aggregates is linear in the sales of the firm.
The task of the econometrician is to extract estimates of uist in this economy. First, I
assume that the econometrician can observe the full economy, and show that the factor
structure of productivity zist potentially confounds the original “demeaning” approach
of Gabaix (2011) in recovering uist. Second, I assume that the econometrician observes
pistzist but is unable to distinguish relative price changes from shocks to zist, which I
argue is true in practice. In this case, I show that estimating a factor model as in Stella
(2015) on firm level data will also give inconsistent estimates of true firm shocks. I then
outline the emprical approach I use in this paper to deal with this problem.
1.3.2 Demeaning approach
The growth of productivity of firm j in sector q is given by:
∆zjqt = λjq∆ft + γjq∆fqt + ∆ujqt. (1.10)
Gabaix (2011) attempts to isolate the aggregate factor by subtracting the (equally-
weighted) mean productivity growth rate of (i) all firms, and (ii) all firms in sector
q.6 In this setup that would imply
∆zjqt −∆z••t = (λjq − λ••)∆ft + (γjq − γ••)∆fqt + ∆ujqt −∆u••t, (1.11)
or, when deducting sectoral averages:
∆zjqt −∆z•qt = (λjq − λ•q)∆ft + (γjq − γ•q)∆fqt + ∆ujqt −∆u•qt, (1.12)
6To be precise, Gabaix (2011) uses the sales to employees ratio as a measure of productivity, which
I abstract from here.
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where x••t = 1SΣ
S
s=1
1
N
ΣNi=1xist and x•st =
1
N
ΣNi=1xist. Gabaix takes each of these ex-
pressions to be the “firm shock”, and then aggregates these to form what he terms the
“granular residual”:
ΓALL,t =
∑
s
∑
i
wist−1∆(zist − z••t), (1.13)
ΓSIC,t =
∑
s
∑
i
wist−1∆(zist − z•st), (1.14)
where the weights wit−1 are lagged sales scaled by lagged nominal GDP (first suggested
by Domar (1961)). Gabaix regresses GDP and TFP growth of the different measures
of φ(L)Γt, where φ(L) is a lag polynomial, and finds that (i) Γt is positively related to
growth in these economic aggregates and (ii) between 25-33% of the variation of these
aggregates can be explained by this measure of firm shocks (judging by the R2).
However notice that either measure of Γt will be contaminated by a measure of the aggre-
gate shock if for some i, λi 6= λ•. In particular, even if there were no firm shocks, Gabaix’s
granular residual Γt would be positively correlated with total output if larger firms were
more sensitive to the aggregate factor than smaller firms (and vice-versa).
1.3.3 Factor model approach
Given the problems with the demeaning approach, Stella (2015) imposes a factor struc-
ture to attempt to distinguish aggregate from firm shocks, using the model proposed by
Foerster et al. (2011). The use of this approach has a number of advantages, notably in
allowing the factor loadings to vary over firms. Stella (2015) reports an impact of firm-
level shocks which are substantially smaller than a Gabaix (2011)-like measure applied
to his dataset, which casts some doubt on the original findings.
However, this approach is not without problems too. The factor-model based approach is
an adaption of Foerster et al. (2011) model of US manufacturing sectors, and is solved by
reference to the social planner’s problem. While this might be appropriate for disaggre-
gating output into sectors, when applied to firms this is problematic as in a decentralised
setting large firms would use their market power to choose different prices/output than
would be chosen by a social planner.
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Another problem is data limitations: particularly the paucity of data documenting net-
work linkages between firms. Input-output linkages create positive correlation between
the outputs of connected firms, and if this information is missing then idiosyncratic
shocks could be misclassified as aggregate shocks. Stella (2015) obtains network linkages
data from the Compustat customer segments database; but this only records “major cus-
tomers” (which account for > 10% of revenue) and hence is likely to understate the true
degree of linkages. That said, a robustness exercise where he uses BEA sector-level esti-
mates to calibrate the input-output linkages does seem to generate similar results.
Finally, model misspecification is another potential problem for this structural approach.
Atalay (2014) argues that the elasticity of substitution between sectors is much lower
than that implied by the Cobb-Douglas production function used in Foerster et al. (2011),
which would tend to understate the effect of sectoral shocks. When applying this model
to firm-level data, the misspecification could work the other way - it might be the case
that firms within the same sector are close substitutes for one another.
In the model presented in this section, a similar problem arises if the consumer’s elasticity
of substitution between different goods is non-unitary and if firm-specific deflators are
not available. Then:
pistzist
Pt
=
pist
Pt
(λsift + γsifst + uist) (1.15)
and recall (1.3):
pist
Pt
= vis
(
cist
Ct
)− 1
ε
.
Suppose that ε > 1, and consider a positive shock to a large firm j in sector q, i.e.
ujqt > 0. Then by (1.9), ∆njqt > 0. In general equilibrium, assuming diminishing
marginal utility of leisure, the wage will increase which will increase the total labour
supply and will “crowd out” the labour used by other firms, lowering their output. In
turn, this will lead to a fall in the price of output of the firm hit by the shock relative to
that of other firms, i.e. ∆ pjqt
p−jqt
< 0. This means that while z−jqt will not be affected by
ujqt, the measured productivity (p−jqtz−jqt) of other firms will increase as their relative
prices increase. Such crowding out is a feature of more complex models of heterogenous
large firms, such as Carvalho and Grassi (2015). If ε < 1 then the contamination will be
converse (i.e. the same shock would lead to “crowding in” of other firm’s output and lower
measured productivity for these firms). To work with firm-level data in the framework
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of Foerster et al. (2011) we require ε = 1, which is a problem if this is not true in the
data.
1.3.4 An external proxy approach
In this section I outline an alternative methodology to recover estimates of granualar
shocks, which should ovecome some of the shortcomings of existing methods in the
literature. First, I discuss the external proxy approach in principle and how it applies
within the framework outlined above. Second, I discuss the particular external proxy
used in the paper and why it is plausible that it is both related to firm-level productivity
and unrelated to aggregate or sectoral information. Finally, I briefly discuss the strategy
for relating firm level shocks recovered with this strategy to aggregate information.
A collection of VARs
Consider a VAR containing the measured productivity growth of firm j and the equally
weighted average growth rate of the productivity of all firms:7
φ(L)

∆(pjqtzjqt)
∆(p•qtz•qt)
∆(p••tz••t)
 =

ejqt
ej•t
e••t
 , (1.16)
where ejqt, e•qt and e••t are the reduced form residuals corresponding to the firm, sectoral
and aggregate equation respectively. As is well understood in the VAR literature, in
general ejqt cannot be used as a measure of structural firm shocks as it is made up of a
linear combination of firm and aggregate shocks:
ejqt
ej•t
e••t
 = B

ujqt
uj•t
u••t
 , (1.17)
7As with the factor model approach, to map the model from section 1.3.1 into a linear VAR framework
would require linearising it around a steady state.
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where the structural shock in the first equation is the idiosyncratic shock pertaining to
the large firm in question (ujqt) while those in the other two equations correspond to
sectoral and aggregate shocks. To extract estimates of the ujqt from the VAR we need
to know B, and the fact that I am focussing particularly on large firms makes many
standard identification assumptions (e.g. a Cholesky decomposition) invalid.
To attempt to deal with these problems, I appeal to the external proxy method proposed
by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013). In particular, assume that
for each firm I have an mist such that:
E [mistuist] = Φ 6= 0, (1.18)
and
E [mistujst] = 0 ∀j 6= i, (1.19)
E [mistujqt] = 0 ∀j, q 6= s, (1.20)
E [mistfqt] = 0 ∀q, (1.21)
E [mistft] = 0. (1.22)
This states that the proxy is correlated with the shocks to the own firm but uncorrelated
with shocks to other firms or aggregate shocks. Conditions (1.18) and (1.19)-(1.22) are
analagous to the relevance and validity conditions from instrumental variable estimation,
though on VAR residuals rather than directly observable variables. As I show in Ap-
pendix 1.B, a series mit which satisfies these conditions is sufficient to back out a unique
estimate the series of uit.
To be precise, the methodology (the first part of which is analagous to two-stage least
squares) proceeds in three steps. First, regress the (potentially confounded) reduced-
form residual corresponding to the firm equation on the instrument, pooling by sector.8
The fitted value from that regression can then be formed:
eˆist = βˆ•smist, (1.23)
8In principle, the first-stage regression could proceed firm-by-firm. In practice, because of the nois-
iness of the relationship between mist and eist it will be useful to run this regression as a panel by
two-digit sector.
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where the fitted value is correlated with the firm shock but by (1.19)-(1.22) it is uncor-
related with other shocks. Note that although the parameter estimate βˆ•s only varies by
sector, the fitted value varies at the company level as it depends on the realised values
of the high-frequency instrument.
Second, as detailed by Gertler and Karadi (2015), we can then run the “second stage”
regressions:
e•st = γ0 + γ1eˆist + ν1,st, (1.24)
e••t = µ0 + µ1eˆist + ν2,st, (1.25)
Under the assumption that the validity conditions (1.19)-(1.22) hold, then these regres-
sions give an estimate of the responsiveness of sector s’s productivity and the overall
economy to a shock to the firm’s productivity, respectively. Notice that although the
first-stage regression is pooled, the fact that this regression is estimated at the firm level
allows productivity shocks affecting larger firms to have stronger impacts on sectoral or
economy-wide average productivity than smaller firms.
Third, we can use the estimated parameters γˆ and µˆ as additional restrictions which
decomposing the variance-covariance matrix of reduced-form residuals on a firm-by-firm
basis:
Σis = BisB
′
is (1.26)
These estimated parameters are enough to pin down a unique estimate of the first column
of Bis when combined with the implicit restrictions in Σis. As detailed in Appendix
1.B, we can then recover a unique estimate of the structural shock associated with firm
productivity.
High-frequency stock price movements as an external proxy
The proxy variable I propose in this paper to isolate the effect of firm shocks is the stock
price return of the company in question on the day they release their quarterly results.
This is defined as:
mist ≡ R̂ist ≡ Rist − β̂0y − β̂1yRIND,t, (1.27)
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where Rist is the total stock return (including dividends) of company i in sector s on day
t, RIND,t is the total index return on day t, and (β̂0y, β̂1y) are the estimated constant
and slope coefficients of the ordinary least squares regression of Rit on a constant and
RIND,t for year y. I drop excess returns corresponding to days on which the RIND,t is
more than two standard deviations away from its annual average, as this would suggest
that a lot of aggregate information might have been released on that day, which would
make the estimate of the firm specific shock less reliable.
There are good a priori reasons to believe that excess stock returns over relatively short
windows around firm specific announcements might be both related to firm productiv-
ity and orthogonal to direct shocks to economic aggregates. First, it has been well
documented in the event study finance literature that positive earnings surprises are
associated with higher stock returns on the day of release (MacKinlay (1997)). Taking
a short window around these results reduces the chance that aggregate news influences
both firm stock prices and productivity. I elaborate on the validity and relevance of the
proxy in section 1.5.
Relating firm-level shocks to economic aggregates
Once a method has been chosen to recover a series of firm or “granular” shocks, the
task is to quantify the effect of such shocks on economic aggregates. To do this, I
adopt the same approach as Gabaix (2011) and Stella (2015). These papers appeal to
a theorem proposed by Hulten (1978), which states that the marginal contribution of a
Hicks-neutral technology shock to one firm on aggregate TFP is scaled by that firm’s
sales. Aggregating across firms:
dTFP
TFP
=
∑
i
∑
s
wist−1uist, (1.28)
where the weights for a productivity shock recovered from a production function based
on gross output are the same as those proposed by Domar (1961): wist = SistYt . This
result is somewhat surprising in that it implies that if we have a measure of the firm
shocks, we don’t need to account for input-output linkages across firms to quantify the
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effect of uist on aggregate TFP.9
As an empirical counterpart to (1.28), consider the following:
Γτ,t =
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
wist−1uˆτ,ist, (1.29)
where τ ∈ {ALL, SIC,HFI} indexes the type of granular shocks used, where τ ∈
{ALL, SIC} are the ‘demeaned’ productivity residuals introduced by Gabaix (2011) as
expressed in equations (1.11) and (1.12), while τ = HFI are the productivity residuals
extracted using the external proxy approach, as detailed in section 1.3.4.
I consider two measures of productivity. First, following Gabaix (2011) I use the sales
to employee ratio. This measure is transparent and has the advantage that it makes my
results more easily comparible with his original paper. For robustness, I also consider
a TFP measure following Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014). This is based on the value
added of the firm, rather than its gross output. In this case, the appropriate weights
to use are instead value added over GDP, rather than sales, as noted by Guellec and
de la Potterie (2001): wist = VistYt , where Vist = Sist − Mist (value added ≡ sales less
intermediate inputs).
1.4 Data
I use four different types of data in this paper: firm accounts data (to construct measures
of firm productivity), stock price data (to construct the high-frequency instrument),
analyst earnings forecasts (as a cross-check on the stock price data), and macroeconomic
data (to relate the firm shocks to economic aggregates). Details about the first two of
these are described briefly below, with a more detailed exposition about how the data
were cleaned and otherwise adjusted relegated to the Appendix.
The National Accounts data are taken from the FRED database maintained by the
9The intuition behind this result is the following. Consider a 1% increase in a firm’s TFP. If firms
don’t respond to that change by altering their capital and labour choices (or, in a richer model, their
intermediate input choices) then the impact of that shock on produced values is indexed by the sales of
the firm. However, because firms before the shock were optimising, the envelope theorem implies that
this is also the increase in total TFP when we allow firms to alter their choices).
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Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and is originally compiled by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, while the measure of TFP growth that I use is taken from the San Francisco
Federal Reserve Bank.10,11
1.4.1 Firm productivity data
Firm level accounts data are taken from the Compustat Quarterly database. I follow
Gabaix (2011) and take firms which were in the top 1000 by sales in each quarter from
1963 to 2015 which were not one of (i) oil firms; (ii) non-oil energy firms; or (iii) fi-
nancial firms. This is the same as Gabaix’s choice of sample except that I also exclude
conglomerates with a large financial component, notably General Electric and Berkshire
Hathaway.12 This yields a baseline unbalanced panel of 3337 firms.
My baseline measure of firm productivity is the sales to employee ratio, following Gabaix
(2011). This allows my work to be more closely compared with his results. Unlike Gabaix
(2011), this paper has to work with quarterly data to take full advantage of information
in quarterly earnings releases. Details of how I clean and seasonally adjust the data are
relegated to Appendix 1.A.1.
For robustness, I construct a measure of firm TFP. I follow Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014)
in adapting the method of Olley and Pakes (1996) for company accounts recorded from
COMPUSTAT. Firm TFP is defined as:
TFPit = log(yit)− β0 − βklog(Kit)− βllog(Lit),
Where yit, Kit and Lit are value added; labour input (defined as the number of workers)
and capital input in real terms respectively. I follow Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014) closely
in the construction of this variable: value added is taken to be the sum of operating
income before depreciation and a proxy of labour costs. Capital and labour are only
10The GDP series used is code GDPC1
11The methodology is discussed in Fernald et al. (2012) and the data are available from http://www.
frbsf.org/economic-research/indicators-data/total-factor-productivity-tfp/
12Even ignoring the financial component of such firms, the fact that they operate in a number of
unrelated business areas makes estimating these firms’ TFP based on a single production function
problematic.
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available annually: as such, I interpolate these series with a spline.
1.4.2 Stock price data
Stock market data is obtained from the Compustat/CRSP linked data. Excess returns
are estimated on an annual rolling basis, as the residual of the daily stock price return
for company i and the return on the S&P 500 on that day.
The principal measure of “firm news” that I use is this excess stock return on the day
on which a firm releases its quarterly results. This day varies by firm, but it is typically
within a month of the end of a firm’s financial quarter. These days are identified by
combining information from the Compustat Quarterly database with Institutional Broker
Estimate System (I/B/E/S). The latter database has the advantage that it contains the
time of release as well as the day, so I am able to attribute results information released
after market close (16:00 EST) to stock changes on the following day (unfortunately
the I/B/E/S database has missing datapoints, so it is necessary to combine it with the
information from Compustat).
Market-relevant information about firms may also become public (and incorporated into
market prices) on days other than those which coincide with quarterly earnings releases.
To try and capture some of this information, I compile filings of Form 8-k from the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database. The SEC requires listed firms
to file a Form 8-k if there is a “material corporate event” which shareholders should know
about. I record the dates (and times, where available) of Form 8-k filed under Sections 7,
8 and 9, which correspond to news plausibly related to firm productivity (I drop filings
on days which coincide with quarterly results days, to avoid double counting). I exclude
Form 8-k filed under other sections, as these relate to information such as changes in
senior management or the firm’s accountant (for instance) which might be market-moving
but are unlikely to be related to firm productivity.
Figure 1.1 shows the average standard deviation of firm excess stock returns (R̂it) in a
twenty-business-day window either side of the release of a firm event: either a quarterly
earnings report or the filing of a form 8-k with the SEC. The volatility of excess stock
returns increases substantially on the day that quarterly results are released. On the
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month leading up to a results day, daily volatility in excess returns (averaged across all
firms) is lower than 2%: on days on which quarterly results are released, this jumps to
over 3.5% before falling again. Two days after the results day, the excess return volatility
falls again to its pre-event day average. A similar pattern, if less dramatic, is observable
using excess return volatility around 8-k days. In this case, the “spike” on the day of the
news is smaller, but the effect appears to be more persistent, though this is consistent
with the fact that 8-k events are not known in advance and are irregular, which may
mean it takes longer for market participants to fully assess their effects.
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Figure 1.1: Excess return volatility increases on results days
Notes: Figures show the median standard deviation of excess returns of stocks around
days on which quarterly results are released (left-hand panel) and days on which a
company files a form 8-k (section 7-9) with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Shaded areas correspond to the 32/68 percentiles of the distribution.
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1.4.3 Analyst Recommendations
To evaluate the high-frequency instrument, I use information based on analyst forecasts
from the Thomson-Reuters I/B/E/S detail database. In particular, I construct two
measures, relating to “surprises” to earnings in the current quarter (assessed by the dif-
ference between the final analyst consensus forecast and the realised value) and surprises
in one quarter out (assessed by revisions to the analyst consensus before and after results
days).
The analyst-based external instrument has one principal advantage over the stock-price
based measure described above: the ability to distinguish surprises which affect the
quarter to which the results pertain (the previous financial quarter) and surprises to
expectations in the next quarter (that is, the quarter during which the results day oc-
curs). Against this advantage is the fact that analyst forecasts are typically made well
in advance of results days, which increases the risk that some of the “surprise” reflects
aggregate, rather than firm-level shocks.
To form my first measure, I take an average of the earnings per share forecasts of analysts
within the fourteen days ahead of the results day. I then subtract the realised earnings
per share value from the I/B/E/S database and scale the result by the stock price on the
day before the results were released. The second measure is similar: I take the average
earning per share forecasts for the next quarter from a two week window prior to the
results day, and subtract the average earnings per share forecast of all forecasts made
in the five days after the results day (forecasts recorded on the day of the results are
ignored), and scale by the same stock price used for the first measure.
To assess the relationship between the size of the earnings surprise and the excess stock
return I conduct a similar exercise to MacKinlay (1997). I divide earnings surprises
(scaled by stock prices) into three groups: those which are more than one standard
deviation above the mean surprise (“good news”), more than one standard deviation
below the mean surprise (“bad news”), and all others (“no news”).13 The cumulative
13I drop very large earnings surprises (absolute value of 0.5 or greater) to stop them distorting the
results. The standard deviation is calculated by taking the standard deviation of forecast errors by
quarter, and averaging over quarters. The mean surprise is slightly positive. This is consistent with
some evidence in the finance literature that earnings or expecations are manipulated by companies so
that they on average beat the average analyst’s estimate, see Terry (2015). This is another reason to be
wary of earnings surprise relative to the analyst consensus as a measure of the firm shock.
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Figure 1.2: Mean cumul. stock returns of firms by results relative to consensus
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative stock returns of two groups of companies: (i) those
which report earnings at least one standard deviation higher than the median analyst
expectation (as captured by the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database) and (ii) those
which report earnings one standard deviation lower than this consensus expectation.
stock returns for the three groups of firms in a forty-one day window around earnings
releases are shown in Figure 1.2. On average, firms which receive “good news” outperform
“no news firms” by 2% over the window, with most of the gain coming on the day on
which results are released. “Bad news” firms underperform by a similar amount, again,
with most of the loss coming on the day on which results are released.
However, these averages hide quite a lot of noise. While cumulative returns for “good
news” firms outperform “bad news” firms on average, there is substantial overlap. This
noisiness weakens the high frequency instrument, and as such pooling firms by sector is
necessary to find relationships of sufficient strength such that weak instrument concerns
are mitigated.
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1.5 Firm-level results
This section documents the relationship between firm-level productivity measures and
stock price surprises. I first discuss how closely my external proxies are related to the
residuals of interest (i.e. the reduced-form residuals from the VAR), which is the counter-
part to the “relevance” condition for instrumental variables. I then turn to a discussion
of the validity of my proxy - i.e. that it is uncorrelated with other structural shocks of in-
terest (in particular, sectoral and aggregate productivity shocks). While this assumption
is not directly testable, I present suggestive evidence using both the differential timing
of firm results days within a quarter and using the panel nature of my dataset that
stock price movements on firm results days are not systematically related to aggregate
information.
1.5.1 Relevance of the proxy
As in standard instrumental variable regression, the results of the procedure adopted
here are only meaningful if the external proxy is sufficiently highly correlated with the
reduced form residual of interest. As detailed in equation (1.23), I pool the first-stage
regressions by (two-digit) sector. While it is possible to run these regressions at the firm
level, the resulting relationships are noisy (as measured by the first-stage F statistic).
This is not surprising: a component of any firm productivity innovation might be an-
ticipated by investors but not by the VAR used here (investors form their expectation
about firm productivity using a much wider range of information than simply lagged
productivity of the firm or sector). This problem is compounded for firms with shorter
time series (due to exit or entry). To deal with this, pooling at the sector level increases
the sample size making it easier to identify the true relationship, at the cost of assuming
that the relationship between stock returns on results days and the firm-specific produc-
tivity shock to be common across firms in the same sector. A priori it does not seem
unreasonable that a 1% increase in firm productivity due to a firm level event is associ-
ated with the same increase in the firm’s stock price independent (e.g.) of the size of the
firm or other covariates.
After discarding small sectors (those with fewer than 300 firm-quarter observations), the
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first-stage regression results indicate that 11 of 53 two-digit sectors covering 47.9% of
firms in my sample have an F-statistic of 10 or greater stipulated as the “rule of thumb”
by Staiger and Stock (1997) using the sales: employees measure of productivity favoured
by Gabaix (2011). The relationship is somewhat stronger when we use the measure of
firm TFP based on the methodology of Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014): here 26 of 49
sectors covering some 81.4% of firms meet this criterion. As not all of the sectors meet
the F≥10 rule of thumb, I construct two different measures of the granular residual.The
first measure includes all firms, while the second excludes firms in sectors which have a
first-stage regression with an F statistic less than 10. I present results of both below:
where they differ I prefer the latter.
1.5.2 Validity of the proxy
The other key assumption needed for identification is that the external proxy is uncor-
related with structural shocks other than the structural shock of interest. Here, taking
stock returns over a relatively short window (one day) minimises the chance that news
pertaining to economic aggregates is released on that day which affects asset prices.
While it is true that shorter windows are often used in investigations of monetary policy
shocks, I do not follow this practice for two reasons. First, most (but not all) firm results
are released outside of market hours. Taking the market close to market close change in
stock prices standardises the measure I am taking over all firms. Second, firms typically
follow up the release of their earnings numbers with an analyst call to elaborate on the
results - for example, to explain whether a surprise in the profit numbers was truly the
consequence of a change in productivity or due to some accounting change. By taking
a short intraday window around results I would risk throwing away stock price changes
resulting from this information.
Another concern about the proxy could be that earnings reports themselves contain
aggregate information. One might expect that this is unlikely a priori as company results
are released after a large amount of higher frequency, more aggregated information has
been released relating to the quarter in question (for example, industrial production,
retail sales and labour market statistics are all released on a monthly basis, and around
half of companies release their results after the first estimate of GDP is released by the
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Bureau of Economic Analysis). As such, it is sensible to think about aggregate growth
as being known, but the distribution (or source) of that growth being revealed in full
when company earning season has completed.
However, we can attempt to address this concern - indirectly - with the data. For
most firms, financial quarters coincide with calendar quarters, but the release of their
earnings information are staggered throughout the following quarter. The date of release
is normally chosen a year or more in advance and the timing is relatively persistent across
quarters. If firm earnings reports do systematically release information about aggregate
or sectoral productivity, then early-reporting firms would reveal more information to the
market than late-reporting firms (as the former would release both idiosyncratic and
aggregate information, while the latter would only release idiosyncratic information). If
so, then we should see two features of the stock price data. First, early-reporting firms
should see a larger increase in the daily volatility of Rit on its results day than late-
reporting firms, and second, early-reporting firms should see a smaller fall in the rolling
correlation between their stock price return on results days and the stock index (the S&P
500) than late reporting firms.
To get a sense if this is happening, I do the following. First, I drop firms for which
financial quarters do not coincide with calendar quarters. I then examine the remaining
firms by three-digit SIC sector. For each sector and quarter, I include a firm-quarter
in an “early” sub-sample if it is one of the first two firms in that sector and quarter to
report, and I include a firm-quarter in a “late” sub-sample if it is one of the last two firms
in a quarter to report (I ignore sector-quarters with fewer than four firms reporting).
Figure 1.3 shows the rolling excess return volatility for these two groups. The first panel
of the chart makes clear that there is no discernable difference in the percentage increase
in return volatility of early- or late- reporting companies, which is consistent with the
idea that aggregate information is not revealed by a subset of companies. The bands
shown correspond to the 32/68 percentiles respectively - in each case the point estimates
for either sub-sample of companies lie within the percentile bands shown of the other,
which indicates that any difference is not statistically significant. The second panel
shows the rolling correlation between the total return of the two pairs of companies and
the S&P 500: again. The fall in this rolling correlations on the results day indicates
that firm-specific information is being released, and the fact that the correlations are not
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statistically distinguishable suggests that firms are not releasing aggregate information
systematically when they release their quarterly results.
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Figure 1.3: Behaviour of stock returns of early vs. late reporters by sector around events
Notes: Contrast of stock returns of companies around days on which quarterly results
are released. Companies divided into two sub-samples: those which are among the first
two to report their results in a quarter and those which are among the last two to
report in a quarter (within the same three-digit sector). Left panel shows the standard
deviation of total returns and the right panel shows rolling correlation with S&P 500 of
each sub-sample. Shaded area/dotted interval are the 32/68 percentile of the
distribution of each sub-sample.
1.6 Aggregate results
In this section I contrast the properties of the granular residual constructed with the
“demeaning” method proposed by Gabaix (2011) with the “high-frequency” approach
proposed in this paper.
First, I perform a similar exercise to Gabaix (2011) in attempting to quantify the impor-
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tance of the granular residual on economic aggregates, namely GDP and TFP growth.
I find that the granular residual calculated with the “demeaning” method substantially
overstates the importance of the granular shock relative to the estimates associated with
the “high-frequency” measure.
To investigate this potential discrepancy, I investigate the possibility that “demeaning”
does not remove aggregate shocks perfectly as larger firms respond more strongly to
aggregate shocks. I show that certain macroeconomic aggregates appear to Granger
cause the “demeaned” granular residuals, which is consistent with the notion that these
measures are not completely clean of aggregate shocks. I also verify that the same is
not true for the method of constructing the granular residual based on high-frequency
financial information.
1.6.1 Comparison with existing estimates
As a first exercise, I recreate the method that Gabaix (2011) uses to quantify the impor-
tance of the demeaned granular residual. To stay as close as possible to Gabaix’s results,
I take the quarterly measures of productivity (i.e. either the “demeaned” measures or the
measure recovered by the high-frequency instrument), use each to construct an index of
productivity shocks and then aggregate this series by year. Then, on an annual basis,
I regress GDP or TFP growth on a constant and the contemporaneous and two lagged
values of the demeaned granular residuals. This gives a sample from 1968-2014.14 The
results are shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 for GDP and TFP growth, respectively.
Each table has four columns, each relating to a different measure of firm shock. The first
two columns use a measure of the granular residual related to the measures of firm shocks
proposed by Gabaix (2011): the first refers to the growth rate of log(sales: employees)
less the average growth rate of that measure for all firms in the sample (corresponding to
equation (1.11)), while the second is same measure but instead demeaning at the three-
digit sectoral level (corresponding to equation (1.12)). The R2 in each case suggests that
a substantial fraction of GDP and TFP are explained by these measures of the granular
residual: 17% (15%) in the case of demeaning by all large firms for GDP (and TFP), and
14The qualitative conclusions of this section do not change markedly if I use the top 1000 firms
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Const. 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Γt 1.141 4.082** -1.315 -1.872
(0.860) (1.533) (0.649) (1.073)
Γt−1 1.975** 3.780*** 0.341 1.259
(0.843) (1.378) (0.618) (1.024)
Γt−2 0.577 1.847 0.646 0.985
(0.849) (1.476) (0.642) (1.028)
T 46 46 46 46
R2 0.170 0.307 0.143 0.127
R2 adj. 0.089 0.239 0.060 0.042
Γ def. ΓALL ΓSIC ΓHFI ΓHFI|F>10
Table 1.1: Regression of GDP growth on different measures of Granular Residual derived
from firm sales:employees ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Const. 0.006** 0.005 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Γt 1.685** 3.408** -0.699 -1.275
(0.690) (1.315) (0.524) (0.863)
Γt−1 0.636 1.288 0.461 1.001
(0.676) (1.182) (0.499) (0.824)
Γt−2 0.336 0.598 0.636 0.694
(0.681) (1.266) (0.518) (0.827)
T 46 46 46 46
R2 0.152 0.191 0.115 0.103
R2 adj. 0.070 0.112 0.029 0.016
Γ def. ΓALL ΓSIC ΓHFI ΓHFI|F>10
Table 1.2: Regression of aggregate TFP growth on different measures of Granular Resid-
ual derived from firm sales:employees ratio
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31% (and 19%) in case of demeaning by the average in the same three digit sector alone.
These results are somewhat lower than those presented in Gabaix (2011), but this can
be largely explained by a shorter sample (Gabaix (2011) presents results using a sample
from 1950-2008, the longer time series made possible by use of annual data).15
The third and fourth column in each table construct the granular residual using measures
of firm shocks using the infomation from firm stock price movements as outlined in
Section 1.3.4. In this case, the fraction of GDP and TFP explained by this measure
of firm shocks is noticeably smaller - at 14% and 13% for GDP, and 12% and 10% for
TFP, respectively). These are noticeably smaller than the measures calculated using the
“demeaning” methodology. More concerning still is that on impact, the point estimate of
the effect of granular shocks is wrongly signed, i.e. a positive granular shock is associated
with lower contemporaneous GDP and aggregate TFP (though these point estimates are
not significantly different from zero).
As a robustness check of these results, I also consider a measure of firm shocks constructed
from a value-added measure of TFP as outlined in Section 1.4.1. These results are shown
in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, respectively. Here the R2 values are considerably lower for both the
“demeaned” and “high-frequency” granular residuals - around 0.12-0.15 when the regres-
sand is GDP, and less than 0.1 when the regressand is (aggregate) TFP. Unlike with the
sales-based measure there is no noticable fall in the fraction of the variance statistically
explained with the “high-frequency” measure relative to the “demeaned” measure.
A visual inspection of a four-quarter moving average of the three sales-based measures of
the granular residual can help shed light on these results, as shown in Figures 1.4, 1.5 and
1.6. Both the “demeaned” granular residuals and the “high-frequency” measure proposed
in this paper turn negative during the 2001 recession and 2008 recessions, consistent with
the “granular hypothesis”. The 2008 recession is particularly interesting - most narrative
accounts of the crisis associate it with problems in the financial sector but the large
negative granular residual (a large part of which is explained by the poor performance of
car manufacturers) suggests that there was a “granular” component to this recession as
well.16 However, the two measures of granular residuals differ for earlier recessions. There
15My sample is over the period 1968-2015. The Compustat quarterly database starts in 1961 and is
initially thinly populated.
16Recall that the granular residual is constructed after dropping financial firms from the sample.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Const. 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Γt -0.031 -0.506 -0.317 -1.218
(1.329) (2.008) (0.209) (0.648)
Γt−1 1.617 2.608 0.084 0.701
(1.201) (1.768) (0.228) (0.695)
Γt−2 2.442* 2.664 0.317 0.886
(1.305) (1.910) (0.208) (0.645)
T 46 46 46 46
R2 0.129 0.119 0.121 0.145
R2 adj. 0.044 0.033 0.036 0.061
Γ def. ΓALL ΓSIC ΓHFI ΓHFI|F>10
Table 1.3: Regression of GDP growth on different measures of Granular Residual derived
from firm TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Const. 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Γt 1.151 0.171 -0.222 -0.750
(1.075) (1.655) (0.169) (0.533)
Γt−1 1.069 1.716 0.063 0.455
(0.971) (1.458) (0.184) (0.572)
Γt−2 1.708 1.012 0.223 0.483
(1.055) (1.575) (0.168) (0.531)
T 46 46 46 46
R2 0.097 0.050 0.095 0.081
R2 adj. 0.008 -0.042 0.007 -0.009
Γ def. ΓALL ΓSIC ΓHFI ΓHFI|F>10
Table 1.4: Regression of aggregate TFP growth on different measures of Granular Resid-
ual derived from firm TFP
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Figure 1.4: Year-on-year GDP growth vs. 4q moving average of “high-frequency” Gran-
ular residual (sales: employee measure)
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Figure 1.5: Year-on-year GDP growth vs. 4q moving average of “all” demeaned Granular
residual (sales: employee measure)
were two NBER recessions at the start of the 1980s, and in this period the “demeaned”
granular residuals are procyclical (and consistent with the granular hypothesis) while
the “high-frequency” granular residual is countercyclical. This negative correlation is
consistent with the negative point estimate of the (contemporaneous) “high-frequency”
granular residual in columns 3-4 in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
In sum, the formulation of the granular residual proposed by Gabaix (2011) suggests
that granular shocks are somewhat more important in explaining aggregate flucutations
than the measure introduced in this paper, using high-frequency stock price movements
as an external proxy.
1.6.2 Granger Causality tests
In section 1.3.2, I argue that a potential weakness of the “demeaning method” of Gabaix
(2011) is the fact that subtracting the mean productivity growth (of either the whole
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Figure 1.6: Year-on-year GDP growth vs. 4q moving average of “sector” demeaned
Granular residual (sales:employee measure)
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economy or a specific sector) will only remove aggregate or sectoral processes if firms
respond to such processes symmetrically. If the productivity process is composed of a
firm, sectoral and aggregate process as in (1.10), namely:
∆zist = λis∆ft + γis∆fst + ∆uist,
then subtracting the mean growth rate of all firms will only remove the aggregate factor
if λis = λ¯ ∀i, s and subtracting the mean growth rate of a sector s from firms in that
sector will only remove the sectoral factor if γis = γ¯s ∀i ∈ s.
To test if this violation might matter in practice, I conduct the following Granger causal-
ity tests. First, I estimate regressions of the following form using quarterly data:
Γτ,t = c+
P∑
j=1
βjxt−j +
P∑
j=1
θjΓτ,t−j + εt, (1.30)
where the regressand is a measure of the granular residual of type τ ∈ {ALL, SIC,HFI},
xt is the variable of interest, where the first two measures are the economy-wide and
sectoral demeaned granular residuals as introduced in Gabaix (2011) and the final type
refers to the high-frequency instrument for firms in sectors which have a first-stage F-
statistic of at least 10 (i.e. these measures correspond to columns 1, 2 and 4 in Tables
1.1 and 1.2).
I then conduct a standard Wald test of the hypothesis that the β coefficients are jointly
equal to zero. If the measure of Γ used is truly an exogenous shock process then we would
not expect that it should be granger-caused by macroeconomic variables. In contrast, if
λis 6= λ¯ (for instance) and if the aggregate process is persistent then we would expect
that some lagged macroeconomic variables could Granger cause the demeaned granular
residual.
The variables of interest I consider are GDP growth, the growth in the real price of
oil and the tightness of Credit Standards as measured by the Federal Reserve Board’s
survey of Senior Loan Officers.17 The rationale for including GDP and the real price
17Data for oil prices are taken from Kilian (2009) and deflated with the CPI. The Senior Loan Officer
Survey Question is the “Net Percentage of Domestic Banks Tightening Standards for Commercial and
Industrial Loans to Large and Middle-Market Firms”. This measure refers to firms with sales of over
$50m annually, a condition which all of the firms in my sample satisfy.
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of oil is that some of the largest firms in the US economy happen to be in sectors
which might be both more cyclical than the average and more sensitive to energy prices
and aggregate economic activity - notably large manufacturers such as General Motors,
Ford and Hewlett-Packard. If such firms are disproportionately represented among the
largest firms in the US, then we might expect aggregate shocks to (say) energy prices to
disproportionately affect very large firms, which would generate a correlation between
the demeaned granular residual and aggregate outcomes independent of the correlation
resulting from true firm-level shocks. The rationale for including a measure of credit
tightness is that this is an aggregate shock which larger firms may be more able to deal
with than smaller firms. All of the firms in the sample are listed on equity markets, so
they are not likely to be financially constrained in the same way that an unlisted firm
might be. However, listed firms do borrow from banks (either long-term or for financing
working capital) and we might expect smaller listed firms to be more reliant on bank
borrowing than the very largest firms in the sample. If so, then an aggregate shock to
credit standards would affect the demeaned granular residual.
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 1.5.18 The first three specifications test the
joint significance of lagged GDP growth and lagged growth in oil prices for predicting
the various measures of the granular hypothesis. The first column shows that these
variables appear to jointly cause the “economy-wide” demeaned granular residual ΓALL,t,
with a p-value of less than 0.05.19 However, the second column indicates that for these
variables, this problem is largely dealt with if we use the sectorally-demeaned measure
of the granular shock. Together, these results are consistent with the intuition that for
oil prices and GDP growth the largest firms are disproportionately in sectors which are
sensitive to energy and real activity, which cast doubt on whether the “economy-wide”
demeaned granular residual is clean of non-firm specific disturbances. The third column
verifies that the “high-frequency” granular residual introduced in this paper is not granger
caused by these variables either.
In specifications (4)-(6), the regressand is credit standards as measured through the
Senior Loan Officers survey. In specification (4), there is not enough evidence to conclude
18I use four lags in each specification
19One possible objection to this finding is that oil market traders could anticipate shocks to large firms,
and oil prices adjust accordingly. However, the coefficients of the unrestricted model suggest that higher
oil prices precede lower values of the granular residual, which is inconsistent with this interpretation
and consistent with the hypothesis that oil prices are reflecting some aggregate factor.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
x dGDP, dpoil dGDP, dpoil dGDP, dpoil Cred Stds Cred Stds Cred Stds
y ΓALL ΓSIC ΓHFI|F>10 ΓALL ΓSIC ΓHFI|F>10
F 2.136 1.009 0.813 0.398 2.589 1.237
pval 0.036 0.431 0.592 0.809 0.042 0.301
T 163 163 163 99 99 99
Start 1974Q2 1974Q2 1974Q2 1990Q2 1990Q2 1990Q2
End 2015Q4 2015Q4 2015Q4 2015Q4 2015Q4 2015Q4
Table 1.5: Granger causality tests: Granular Residuals derived from sales: employees on
different economic variables
at the 10% level of significance that the “economy-wide” granular residual is Granger
caused by credit standards. However, credit standards do appear to granger cause the
“sectoral” demeaned granular residual at the 5% level of significance. This suggests that
an aggregate credit shock would affect small and large firms differently within the same
sector, which indicates that this measure of firm-level shocks too might contain aggregate
components. Finally, the sixth column verifies that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the “high frequency” granular residual is not Granger caused by this measure of
credit standards either.
To sum up, if any measure of the granular residual contains aggregate or sectoral shocks,
then any correlation between this measure and economic aggregates might overstate the
importance of firm shocks. One reason that the “demeaned” granular residual might not
completely clean productivity growth rates of aggregate or sectoral shocks is that large
firms respond differentially to smaller firms to such shocks, a problem which should not
in principle apply to the “high-frequency” granular residual introduced in this paper.
This section presents empirical evidence that certain macroeconomic variables which we
might expect to reflect shocks which a priori affect large and small firms differently do
appear to granger cause the demeaned granular residual (but not the “high-frequency”
counterpart), which is consistent with this interpretation.
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1.7 Conclusion
One possible microfoundation for total factor productivity (TFP) shocks would be shocks
to individual large firms. Using a simple model, I argue that existing empirical ap-
proaches of extracting such shocks have important shortcomings - either they abstract
from the possibility that the effect of aggregate shocks on individual firms can vary over
firms or - in the case of the factor model literature - they are constrained by poor data on
intra-firm linkages and strong structural assumptions needed to keep the model tractable.
I propose a new method to recover estimates of such shocks, using the variation in stock
returns around the days on which companies annouce results. I claim this variation is
related to firm-specific information but unrelated to aggregate information. While I find
that large firms do appear to drive aggregate fluctuations in GDP and TFP growth,
quantitatively my estimates suggest a much smaller fraction of aggregate fluctuations
are driven by these factors than the original quantifation exercise conducted by Gabaix
(2011).
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1.A Data Appendix
1.A.1 Construction of firm-level TFP
The construction of firm level TFP on a quarterly basis is based on the methodology
proposed by Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014). This section describes how I apply their
method to my data: the principal difference with their study is that I attempt to con-
struct a quarterly measure of TFP rather than an annual measure. I proceed in three
steps. First, I outline the construction of the measure of value added at the firm level,
including cleaning the data and seasonal adjustment. Second, I outline how I construct
a measure of labour input on a quarterly basis, before explaining construction of the
capital input.
Construction of Value Added
As Compustat accounts do not directly report intermediate inputs, it is only possible to
construct a proxy of value added. Following Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014), the proxy of
firm level value added I use is:
V Ait = OIBDPQit + LabourCostit (1.31)
Where OIBDPQ is operating income before depreciation from Compustat. By defini-
tion,
OIBDPQit = SALEQit − (COGSQit −XSGAQit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
XOPRQit
XOPRQ is operating expenses, the sum of COGSQ (the cost of goods sold) and XSGAQ
(selling and general adminstrative expenses). Intuitively, the two terms in the expression
for value added correspond to payments to capital and labour respectively.
The Compustat Quarterly database has a number of data anomalies which are not present
in the annual database. To clean the OIBDPQ, SALEQ and XOPRQ series, I proceed
as follows:
1. Any part of the time series which has the form [...NXN...], where X is data and N
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is missing data, is transformed to [...NNN...]. This is because some annual values
are erroneously stored in the Compustat Quarterly database at the financial year
end.
2. Any part of a company time series of the form [...NXX...] is transformed to
[...NNX...]. This is because a number of missing quarterly observations’ data
are combined into the datapoint for the following quarter.
3. For both SALEQ and XOPRQ I identify “unusual” one-off spikes in the following
way: first, I calculate the quarterly growth rate, and discard the top and bottom
5% of my sample. I then calculate the standard devation of the remaining sample.
I then identify quarters with “exceptional” sales/costs in the following way: if a
quarter has either a postive growth rate followed by a negative growth rate, or
a negative growth rate followed by a postive growth rate which are both more
than three times this “trimmed” standard deviation, that quarter is treated as
exceptional. I discard such quarters.20
I proxy labour cost as:
LabourCostit = EMPit ∗ waget
where total employment EMPit is defined below, and waget is the average wage provided
by the Bureau of Labour Statistics. This is the same proxy as used by Imrohoroglu and
Tüzel (2014). The use of this proxy is motivated by the fact that the explicit entry for
labour costs is sparsely populated in Compustat Annual (and does not exist in Compustat
Quarterly). Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014) perform a robustness check and claim that
the growth rate of this proxy matches well with the the direct entry of labour costs where
both exist.
Note that as labour costs is a slow moving term, the bulk of variation in the quar-
terly growth of firm-value added comes from volatility in OIBDPQit. I also deflate the
measure of value added by the GDP deflator.
20Typically such one off spikes are due to accounting changes which do not reflect the underlying
productivity of the firm. For example, from 2012 Verizon adjusts its pension liabilities in the fourth
quarter of every year to account for changes in interest rate and mortality assumptions. This charge
is technically a labour cost so passes through operating expenses, but does not reflect the underlying
productivity of Verizon.
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Labour and Capital
The number of employees is recorded in the Compustat Annual database, but not the
Compustat Quarterly database. As such, I assign the Compustat Annual number to the
final quarter in the financial year for each company (as the annual number corresponds
to the end-of-year number, not an annual average) and then interpolate the intervening
quarters using a spline. The results reported in the paper are robust to using a linear
interpolation.
While for some companies a quarterly measure of Property, Plant and Equipment (the
basic measure of capital) does exist, the series is sparse and implausibly volatile (in the
case of General Motors and Boeing, for example, the end of year numbers align with the
Compustat Annual number, but the intervening quarters show a sharp drop in Property,
Plant and Equipment recorded). As such, I use the annual data (series PPEGT in
Compustat).
Following Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014), I need to convert this (nominal) value for the
capital stock into real terms. I proceed as follows. First, I calculate the average age of the
capital stock in years by taking the ratio of current depreciation (DP) over accumulated
depreciation (DPACT). Then, I deflate the Property, Plant and Equipment at time t by
the investment deflator (from the national accounts) at time t− j, where j is the average
age of the capital stock. This is equivalent to assuming that all of the capital stock was
created j periods before. After I have estimates for the real capital stock, I interpolate
between the annual values to get a quarterly series in the same manner as the Labour
series.
Calculating TFP
With value added, labour and (real) capital estimates on a quarterly basis, I can construct
estimates of TFP by applying a two step procedure similar to that proposed by Olley
and Pakes (1996) which is designed to deal with both bias from simultaneity between
productivity and the labour input decision and survival bias. The exposition here is very
close to that of Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014): I report it for the convenience of the
reader. Consider the log-linear production function:
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vit = α0 + αkkit + αllit + zit + uit (1.32)
where vit is log value added of firm i in period t, kit is the log of the real capital stock, and
lit is the log of the number of employees, zit is an unobserved hicks-neutral productivity
shock and uit is an error. Naively estimating (1.32) by least squares leads to two separate
problems. First, the unobserved productvity shock zit is likely to be correlated with lit (a
“time to build” assumption means that it is usual to treat kit as predetermined). Second,
if firms which recieve a low productivity draw are more likely to exit, this will also
generate survivorship bias. To proceed, Olley and Pakes (1996) note that the current
investment decision can be described by the some function
iit = i(zit, kit)
where iit is investment by firm i in period t, and is monotonically increasing in zit. This
allows us to invert the investment function:
zit = h(iit, kit)
Define
φit = α0 + αkkit + h(iit, kit) (1.33)
Combining (1.32) and (1.33):
vit = αllit + φit + uit (1.34)
By appoximating φit with a second order polynomial in iit and kit, it is possible to get
consistent estimates of αl which controls for the simultaneity problem. The second step
of the Olley and Pakes (1996) regression deals with surviorship bias. Consider:
Et [vit+1 − αˆllit+1] = α0 + αkkit + Et [zit+1|zit, survival] (1.35)
The last term: the expectation of productivity at t+1 given both current productivity
and survival, is a function of zit and Pˆsurvival,t, the probability of survival from t to t+1.
The latter is the fitted value from the estimation of a probit model regressing survival
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on a second order polynomial in capital and investment. It is then possible to estimate
the following expression by nonlinear least squares:
vit+1 − αˆllit+1 = α0 + αkkit + ρzit + τ Pˆsurvival,t + uit+1 (1.36)
where zit = φ̂it − α0 − αkkit is assumed to follow an AR(1) process. This estimation
step gives a consistent estimator for α0 and αk. With the parameters of the production
function in hand, it is possible to extract estimates of zit.
I follow this procedure using data on vit, lit and kit from the Compustat Annual database
at the three digit industry level.
Once I have estimates for α0, αk, αl, I can recover an estimate of TFP by using (1.32).
I then seasonally adjust this measure using a moving average filter. Following Gabaix
(2011) I winsorize the quarterly productivity growth rates. This reduces the impact of
extreme growth rates which might be brought about (for example) by corporate actions
such as mergers or accounting changes rather than true growth in firm productivity. I
winsorize this data at a 30% quarterly growth rate.
1.A.2 Stock price information
Calculating Excess Stock Returns
Following the methodology of MacKinlay (1997), I calculate excess stock returns for
company i as:
R̂it = Rit − β̂0y − β̂1yRIND,t (1.37)
where Rit is the total stock return (including dividends) of company i on day t, RIND,t
is the total index return on day t, and (β̂0y, β̂1y) are the estimated constant and slope
coefficients of the ordinary least squares regression of Rit on a constant and RIND,t for
year y. I drop excess returns corresponding to days on which the RIND,t is more than
three standard deviations away from its annual average.
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Stock price data is obtained from COMPUSTAT/CRSP linked data. The benchmark
results use the total returns of the S&P 500 as the appropriate index, though the results
are robust to using the CRSP equally-weighted index as well.
Results days
Results days are obtained by combining the RDQ series from the COMPUSTAT Quar-
terly database with data from Thomson Reuters Institutional Broker Estimate System
(I/B/E/S). The latter is used as it records the time of release as well as the date. If the
time falls after market close (16:00 EST) then I take the following day’s excess return.
If the I/B/E/S data is missing, I assume that the results are released before the market
close. I also check my results for robustness by using two-day returns, but this makes
little difference to the reported results.
Days on which 8-k forms are released are identified by the time of filing in the Security
and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database. As with results days, I treat filing times
(when available) after 16:00 EST as pertaining to the following day’s market move.
1.B Recovering structural shocks using an external proxy
Consider the VAR system:
φ(L)yt = et
et = Bεt
The standard identification problem arises as Σ = BB′ contains n2 unknowns but only
(n+1)n
2
equations. Mertens and Ravn (2013) show that if we have an external proxy,
mt, which satisfies conditions (1.18) and (1.19)-(1.22) then it is possible to identify the
column of B corresponding to variable p and calculate impulse responses to shocks to
this variable. In general, this method does not deliver full identification of the system in
question. However, it is possible for us to back out a unique time series of the structural
shock correlated with the proxy. Suppose that this shock is ordered first, and note that
the decomposition must satisfy both
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i. Σˆ = BB′
ii. the estimates of the first column of B using the external instrument
Let B0, B1 be matrices satisfying both (i) and (ii). Then there exists a Q such that:
B1 = B0
1 0
0 Q
 = B0Q˜ (1.38)
where Q′Q = I. Then
εt = B
−1et
= Q˜−1B−10 et
Note that
Q˜−1 = Q˜′ =
1 0
0 Q′

εp,t
εq,t
 =
1 0
0 Q′
B−10
ep,t
eq,t

Which means that any Q which is orthonormal (satisfies Q′Q = I) will give the same
time series of {εp} as any other orthonormal Q.
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Chapter 2
Predictable Recoveries
2.1 Introduction
Accurate forecasts of future economic growth are very valuable, for example, because
they are needed for policymakers to decide on the appropriate stance of monetary and
fiscal policy. Good forecasts are also important for the private sector, for example, for
investment decisions or purchases of durable consumption goods. For these reasons,
it is important that such forecasts are done with utmost care; forecasts that are too
pessimistic or too buoyant could induce the wrong decisions and be quite harmful. Un-
derstanding what lies ahead is especially important during recessions, which explains
the strong interest to understand what the short-term and long-term consequences of
economic downturns are for future output levels.
Campbell and Mankiw (1987) argued that:
“The data suggest that an unexpected change in real GDP of 1 percent
should change one’s forecast by over 1 percent over a long horizon.”
Thus, shocks to GNP are permanent. Moreover, it implies that reductions in real activity
are associated – if anything – with predictable deteriorations, not predictable recoveries.
More recently, this quote was repeated on Mankiw’s blog.1 Campbell and Mankiw (1987)
1See: http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2009/03/team-obama-on-unit-root-hypothesis.
html.
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base their conclusion on estimated univariate ARMA models, that is,2
φ (L) ∆yt = a0 + θ (L) et, (2.1)
where yt is the log of real GDP and et is a serially uncorrelated shock. In this class of
time-series models, there is only one type of shock, that is, the response of output to
realizations of et is always the same, independent of why there is a shock to output.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we document that the claim made in
Campbell and Mankiw (1987) is not very accurate. Using a simple multivariate time
series model, we show that US recessions were often (but not always) followed by pre-
dictable recoveries.3 Consistent with the results in Campbell and Mankiw (1987), these
recoveries were not predicted by univariate time-series models.
The second contribution of this paper is to put forward reasons why univariate time-
series models for GDP may lead to inaccurate forecasts. Key in our arguments is that
GDP is an aggregate of other random variables.
The first reason is that a univariate representation does not have the flexibility to incorpo-
rate shocks with different persistence levels. A striking illustration is given in Blanchard
et al. (2013). They construct an example in which the correct univariate specification of
a stochastic variable that is the sum of an integrated variable with predictable changes
and a stationary variable, also with predictable changes, is a random walk. That is, us-
ing only information about the aggregate variable, the correct univariate representation
indicates that all changes are permanent, even though both innovations of the underly-
ing system imply predictable further changes. We derive a more general version of this
result.
The key lesson is the following. Macroeconomic aggregates are likely to be the sum
of stationary and non-stationary variables. A correct univariate representation of such
2They allow for the possibility that θ (L) has a root equal to 1, which would imply that yt is stationary
around a deterministic time trend.
3We also compare univariate and multivariate time-series models to predict UK recoveries. Whereas
several US recessions were followed by remarkable recoveries, economic recoveries in the UK were much
more gradual and the predictions of the two types of models are similar. However, the multivariate model
does outperform the univariate model during the great recession. In particular, the multivariate model
correctly predicts a further deterioration in the initial phase of the economic downturn and correctly
predicts its long-lasting impact.
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a variable must indicate that it is non-stationary, which means that the impact of the
shock of the univariate representation necessarily has a permanent impact. We show that
similar distortions occur when a random variable is the sum of two stationary variables
with different persistence levels.
The second reason that univariate models may prove problematic is that the true ARMA
representation of an aggregate variable may be more complex than the most complex
ARMA process of each of its component series. This argument, pointed out by Granger
and Morris (1976) and Granger (1980), means that with a finite data sample it might
be difficult to identify the correct ARMA specification. This means that univariate time
series models for aggregate variables may generate misleading forecasts. In this paper,
we analyze how the under-parameterization of a univariate time series model can lead
to biased forecasts.
We compare predictions of the univariate representation with those based on a VAR of
GDP’s expenditure components. It strengthens our argument that even such a simple
multivariate time series model generates quite different forecasts during recessions. This
finding is consistent with results from the forecasting literature that richer models can
outperform univarate time series models.4 Nevertheless, univariate time-series models
have a long history and remain important. Nelson (1972) documents that large-scale
macroeconometric models with many equations do not outperform forcasts made by
simple ARIMA models. Similarly, Edge and Gurkaynak (2010) and Edge et al. (2010)
show that forecasts made by DSGE models can be worse than a simple forecast of
constant output growth.5
In section 2.2, we provide some theoretical background and discuss reasons why uni-
variate representations may overestimate the long-run impact of economic downturns.
In section 2.3, we illustrate some key time-series properties of US GDP. In section 2.4,
we compare the precision of forecasts made by univariate and multivariate time-series
4Fair and Shiller (1990) also show that GDP forecasts based on the sum of forecasts of GDP’s
components help improve forecasts when compared with univariate forecasts. They use univariate
representations of the components, which makes it possible to disaggregate at a higher level. Stock
and Watson (2002) generate forecasts using a small number of indexes that are based on the principal
components of a large set of economic variables. We refer the reader to Chauvet and Potter (2013) for
a recent survey of the forecasting literature.
5By contrast, Smets and Wouters (2007) show that their DSGE model performs better in forecasting
than a Bayesian VAR.
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models. In section 2.5, we document what this meant for forecasts made during US
post-war recessions. In section 2.6, we show that multivariate representations also have
advantages for predicting UK GDP, but for quite different reasons than the ones outlined
above. The last section concludes.
2.2 Econometrics of univariate time-series models
In section 2.2.1, we illustrate why univariate time-series representations can give mis-
leading predictions even if they are correctly specified. In particular, it is possible that
the variable of interest, yt, is a random walk and (i) it is not necessarily true that all
changes in this variable have a permanent effect and (ii) the model’s predictions made
during recessions systematically overpredict the persistence of the downturn. In sec-
tion 2.2.2, we give reasons why it may be difficult to get a correctly specified univariate
representation for aggregate variables.
2.2.1 Univariate representation: Missing information and bias
Consider the following data generating process (dgp) for yt:6
yt ≡ xt + zt,
(1− ρL)xt = ex,t,
(1− ρL) (1− ρzL) zt = ez,t,
Et [ex,t+1] = Et [ez,t+1] = Et [ex,t+1ez,t+1] = 0, Et
[
e2x,t+1
]
= σ2x,Et
[
e2z,t+1
]
= σ2z ,
(2.2)
where Et [·] denotes the expectation conditional on current and lagged values of xt and
zt. The persistence of the effects of ex,t on xt is determined by the value of ρ and the
persistence of the effects of ez,t on zt is controlled by both ρ and ρz. We assume that
−1 < ρ < 1, (2.3)
−1 < ρz ≤ 1, (2.4)
ρz
ρ
> 1. (2.5)
6This time-series specification is a generalization of the one studied in Blanchard et al. (2013).
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We define ey,t such that the following holds:7
(1− ρzL) yt = ey,t, (2.6)
The unconditional autocovariance of ey,t and ey,t−j, E [ey,tey,t−j], is given by
E [ey,tey,t−j] =
ρj
1− ρ2σ
2
z +
(
(ρ− ρz) ρj−1 + (ρ− ρz) ρ
j
1− ρ2
)
σ2x. (2.7)
This implies that the autocovariances of ey,t are equal to zero if the following equation
holds:8
σ2z =
(ρz − ρ) (1− ρzρ)
ρ
σ2x. (2.8)
If this equation is satisfied, then ey,t is serially uncorrelated, and the correct univariate
time-series specification of yt is an AR (1) with coefficient ρz.
In this univariate representation for yt, there is only one shock, ey,t, and the persistence of
the effects of this shock is solely determined by ρz. Thus, the value of ρ does not matter
at all! This is remarkable given that ρ affects the persistence of both fundamental shocks,
ex,t and ez,t.
To understand why the univariate representation misses key aspects of the underlying
system, consider the case considered in Blanchard et al. (2013) when ρz = 1. The
univariate representation is then given by
yt = yt−1 + ey,t. (2.9)
That is, ∆yt is white noise and yt is a random walk. Although yt is a random walk,
almost all changes in yt imply predictable further changes according to the underlying
multivariate dgp.9 In particular, if ∆yt < 0 because ex,t < 0, then there is a predictable
7It is always true that
(1− ρzL) (1− ρL) yt = (1− ρzL) ex,t + ez,t.
Thus, an equivalent definition of ey,t would be the following:
(1− ρL) ey,t = (1− ρzL) ex,t + ez,t.
These two equations are helpful in deriving the formulas in this section.
8σz > 0, since we assumed that ρz/ρ > 1.
9In the (very) special case that (1− ρ)xt happens to be equal to ρ∆zt, then E[yt+k] = yt for k ≥ 1.
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recovery in yt, since xt = ρxt−1 + ex,t and 0 < ρ < 1. If ∆yt < 0 because ez,t < 0,
then there is a predictable further deterioration, since ∆zt = ρ∆zt−1 + ez,t and ρ > 0.
If one only observes that ∆yt < 0, then one has to weigh the two possible cases and in
this example the two opposing effects exactly offset each other, leading the forecaster to
predict that the level of output will remain the same.
Although the implications are most striking when ρz = 1, which is the case considered
in Blanchard et al. (2013), the analysis presented here makes clear that the univariate
representation of yt does not incorporate the role of ρ for any value of ρz such that
−1 < ρz ≤ 1.
The dgp considered in this section is special because the forecastability that is present
in the different components cancels out and disappears in the univariate representation.
It is true more generally, however, that important information is lost in the univariate
representation of the sum of variables.
Is the predicted long-run impact correct on average? The previous discussion
showed that the univariate representation given in equation (2.6) clearly misses some as-
pects of the underlying data generating process. Next, we turn to the question whether
the univariate representation generates (long-term) predictions that are on average cor-
rect.
To simplify the discussion, we focus on a particular version of the dgp given in equa-
tion (2.2). We assume that ρz = 1 and equation (2.8) is satisfied, so that the univariate
representation of yt is a random walk. Moreover, we set σx = σz = σ, which implies that
ρ = 0.381966 according to equation (2.8). Finally, we assume that ex,t and ez,t can take
only two values, namely −σ and +σ, both with equal probability. Note that the value
of yt remains unchanged if ex,t and ez,t have the opposite sign.
Although yt has a random-walk representation, it systematically overpredicts the long-
term consequences when output falls, i.e., during recessions, and it systematically un-
derpredicts long-term consequences when output increases.
Before showing this, we first consider the case when output remains the same, which
happens if ex,t and ez,t have the opposite sign. The (long-run) predictions based on the
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random-walk specification remain the same, since yt remains the same. However, the
true long-run predictions are affected as follows:
limτ−→∞ Et [yt+τ ]− yt = +σ/ (1− ρ) if ez,t = +σ and ex,t = −σ and
limτ−→∞ Et [yt+τ ]− yt = −σ/ (1− ρ) if ez,t = −σ and ex,t = +σ.
(2.10)
Thus, when yt remains the same, then one fails to recognize that the long-run value of yt
has gone up half of the time and fails to recognize that this long-run value has gone down
the other half of the time. However, the forecasts are not systematically wrong.
Now consider the case in which output drops, which happens when ex,t = ez,t = −σ.
The drop in output is equal to −σx − σz = −2σ. The random-walk specification implies
that the long-run impact is identical to the short-term impact, that is,
lim
τ−→∞
Êt
[
yft,t+τ
]
− yt = −2σ, (2.11)
where Êt [·] is the expectation according to the (correct) univariate representation. The
true long-run impact of the shock, however, is equal to
lim
τ−→∞
Et [yt+τ ]− yt = −σ/(1− ρ) = −1.618σ. (2.12)
That is, in a recession, the univariate representation systematically overpredicts the
long-run negative impact of the economic downturn. Similarly, the univariate represen-
tation systematically overpredicts the long-run positive impact of an increase in yt. So
the predictions are not biased, but one clearly is too pessimistic during recessions and
too optimistic during booms if one would make predictions based on the random-walk
specification.
In this stylized example in which ex,t and ez,t can take only two values, one could dras-
tically improve on the predictions of the univariate representation even if one could not
observe xt or zt, but knows the true dgp. The reason is that a drop in yt implies that
ex,t and ez,t are both negative and an increase implies that both shocks are positive.
The idea that the magnitude of the unexpected change in yt has information about the
importance of ex,t and ez,t is also true for more general specifications of ex,t and ez,t, as
long as one has information about the distribution of the two shocks. If one observes a
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very large drop in yt, then it is typically the case that it is more likely that ex,t and ez,t
are both negative than that ex,t is positive and ez,t is so negative it more than offsets
the positive value of ex,t or vice versa. That is, the larger the economic downturn the
larger the probability that a certain fraction of this downturn is driven by the transitory
shock, that is, the larger the probability that a fraction of the drop in real activity will
be reversed.
2.2.2 Aggregated variables and correctly specifying their dgps
Aggregating ARMA processes. In this section, we highlight another problem with
working with aggregated variables. We illustrate that the correct ARMA representation
of an aggregate variable may very well be more complex than the most complex ARMA
process for each of the component series. Formally, if xt is an ARMA(px, qx) and zt is
an ARMA(pz, qz), then yt ≡ xt + zt is an ARMA(p, q) and p and q satisfy the following
condition:10
p ≤ px + pz and q ≤ max{qx + pz, qz + px}. (2.13)
These conditions give upper bounds for the ARMA representation of the sum, yt. Thus,
the ARMA representation of yt is not necessarily of a higher order than those of xt
and zt. In fact, in section 2.2.1 we gave an example in which an AR (1) variable and
an AR (2) variable add up to an AR (1) variable.11 But that example relies on specific
parameter restrictions. In practice, one should not rule out the possibility that the
univariate representation of a sum of several random variables could be quite complex.
In fact, Granger (1980) argues that an aggregate of many components—as is the case
for typical macroeconomic variables—may exhibit long memory.12
One might think that the solution to this dilemma is to use more complex ARMA
10See Granger and Morris (1976).
11In theory it is, of course, even possible that the sum of random variables is not random.
12One aspect that seems to be ignored in the econometrics literature is that the dgps of the individual
components may be “aligned” to the same factors, which could mean that the time-series representations
of the components are similar, making it less likely that the aggregate has a much more complex
representation than its components. For example, if markets are complete, then market prices will align
agents’ marginal rates of substitution—and, thus, their consumption growth processes—even if agents
face very different income processes.
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processes for aggregate variables. The problem is that the model has to be estimated
with a finite amount of data, consequently the values of p and q cannot be too high. But
if the values of p and/or q are too low, then the dgp could be misspecified.13
Simple example. We will now give a simple example, in which the predictions of a
univariate time-series model for an aggregated variable are quite bad if that time-series
model is not more complex than the most complex time-series representation of the
components.
Consider the following dgp:
yt ≡ xt + zt,
xt = ρxxt−1 + ex,t,
zt = ez,t,
Et [ex,t+1] = Et [ez,t+1] = 0,
Et
[
e2x,t+1
]
= σ2x,
Et
[
e2z,t+1
]
= σ2z ,
(2.14)
with −1 < ρx < 1. Thus, yt is the sum of two stationary random variables, an AR(1)
and white noise. Equation (2.14) implies that
(1− ρxL) yt = ex,t + (1− ρxL) ez,t. (2.15)
The first-order autocorrelation of the term on the right-hand side is not equal to zero
unless ρx = 0, but higher-order autocorrelation coefficients of this term are equal to
zero. Consequently, yt is an ARMA (1, 1). That is, there is a value for θ such that the
following is the correct univariate time-series representation of yt:
(1− ρxL) yt = (1 + θL) ey,t, (2.16)
where ey,t is serially uncorrelated. The value of θ is given by the following expres-
13The misspecification is likely to be worse than indicated in this section. Typically, log-linear pro-
cesses are more suitable than linear processes. But if yt ≡ xt + zt and xt and zt are log-linear processes,
then neither yt nor ln(yt) is a linear process and the convention of modelling ln(yt) as a linear process
is, thus, not correct. In fact, the effects of shocks on yt would be time-varying. These issues are further
discussed in Haan et al. (2011).
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sion:14
θ =
ρx
(−E [ex,tez,t]− E [e2z,t])
E
[
e2y,t
] . (2.17)
The most complex component of yt is xt, which is an AR(1). So suppose that yt is also
modelled as an AR(1). That is,
yt = ρ˜yyt−1 + e˜y,t. (2.18)
If we abstract from sampling uncertainty, we can pin down the value of ρ˜y using popu-
lation moments:
ρ˜y =
E [ytyt−1]
E [y2t ]
=
(ρx + θ) (1 + ρxθ)
(1− ρ2x) + (ρx + θ)2
. (2.19)
We are interested in whether this AR(1) specification would tend to over- or underes-
timate the long term effects of shocks by comparing |ρ˜y| with |ρx|. If |ρ˜y| > |ρx|, then
the AR(1) specification would tend to overstate the true degree of persistence. It is
straightforward to show that |ρ˜y| > |ρx| if and only if θρx > 0, that is, if ρx and θ have
the same sign.15 Equation (2.17) implies that this happens if
− E [ex,tez,t]− E
[
e2z,t
]
> 0. (2.21)
This condition is satisfied if the covariance of ex,t and ez,t is sufficiently negative. Simi-
larly, |ρ˜y| < |ρx| if and only if ρx and θ have the opposite sign, which happens if
− E [ex,tez,t]− E
[
e2z,t
]
< 0. (2.22)
14Since ey,t is white noise, it must be true that
E [(1 + θL) ey,t × (1 + θL) ey,t−1] = θE
[
e2y,t
]
.
It is also true that
E [(1 + θL) ey,t × (1 + θL) ey,t−1] = ρx
(−E [ex,tez,t]− E [e2z,t]) ,
since (1 + θL) ey,t = ex,t + (1− ρxL) ez,t and both ex,t and ez,t are white noise. Combining both
equations gives the expression for θ.
15Equation (2.19) implies that |ρ˜y| > |ρx| if
(1−ρ2x)
(1−ρ2x)+(ρx+θ)2
θ > 0 when ρx > 0,
(1−ρ2x)
(1−ρ2x)+(ρx+θ)2
θ < 0 when ρx < 0.
(2.20)
Consequently, |ρ˜y| > |ρx| if and only if θρx > 0, that is, if ρx and θ have the same sign.
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This condition would be satisfied if the two shocks are positively correlated.
To shed some light on the possible consequences of using an AR (1) as the law of mo-
tion for yt, we consider the case when the two shocks have the following very simple
relationship:
ez,t = αex,t. (2.23)
Since ex,t and ez,t are perfectly correlated, there is only one type of shock and there is
a univariate time-series specification of yt that completely captures the dynamics of yt.
Now we investigate what the consequences of misspecifying the ARMA(1, 1) process as
an AR(1)—as an AR(1) is the most complex of the individual underlying time series
processes.
Figure 2.1 plots ρ˜y, i.e., the value of the coefficient of the AR (1) representation of yt, as
a function of the true dominant root in the dgp of yt, i.e., ρx. The top panel considers
the case when the two shocks are negatively correlated (α < 0). In this case, ρ˜y is greater
than ρx and so the AR(1) process overstates the true amount of persistence. Conversely,
if the shocks are positively correlated ρ˜y is less than ρx, as shown in the lower panel.
These two panels document that long-term persistence is increased substantially for lower
values of ρx when α is negative and that long-term persistence is decreased substantially
for higher values of ρx when α is positive.
Figure 2.2 displays IRFs for three sets of parameter values. Each panel plots the true
response of yt to a one-time shock in ex,t and the response according to the AR (1) spec-
ification for yt. These three panels clearly document that misspecifying the aggregate
variable yt as an AR(1)—the correct specification of the most complex of the underlying
processes—can give inaccurate impulse responses at both short and long horizons. The
AR(1) representation of yt overestimates the long-term consequences of the shock when
ex,t and ez,t are negatively correlated and underestimates them when the two shocks are
positively correlated. The bottom two panels document that these bad long-term predic-
tions only become apparent at forecast horizons of over 30 periods. At forecast horizons
shorter than 30 periods, the AR (1) representation of yt overestimates the consequences
of the crisis by a large margin when the shocks are positively correlated and vice versa.
For example, when the shocks are negatively correlated, then the AR(1) representation
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Figure 2.1: AR(1) coefficient of yt = xt + zt according to the incorrect univariate repre-
sentation
Notes: The graph displays the root to the AR(1) representation of yt = xt + zt as a
function of the AR root in the true time series representation of yt when ez,t = αex,t.
The solid line is the 45◦ line.
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predicts that the initial reduction will be followed by an immediate but gradual recovery.
By contrast, the true response is a further deterioration of almost the same magnitude
followed by a somewhat faster recovery.
In this section, we focused on a case in which the most complex time-series specification of
a component is an AR(1), that is, a relatively simple process. Although the correct time-
series specification of the aggregate is more complex, namely an ARMA(1, 1), it has only
two parameters and one should be able to estimate this more complex time-series model
with data sets of typical length. One can also improve on theAR (1) specification by using
higher-order AR processes, although these would—like the AR(1)—not be correct either,
unless the number of lags is high enough to result in a sufficiently accurate approximation.
However, the option to estimate a more complex representation may not always be
feasible. If the two components are, for example, both an AR(4), one would have to
estimate an ARMA(8, 4), and if yt is the sum of three AR(4) processes, then one would
have to estimate an ARMA(12, 8) to make sure that the univariate representation is
not misspecified. In the next section, we document that a better strategy might be to
estimate separate time-series models for the components and then explicitly aggregate
the forecasts of the components to obtain forecasts for the aggregated variables.
2.3 Time series properties of US GDP
In this section, we discuss the relevance of the analyis in the last section by comparing an
estimated univariate representation of US GDP with the representation that is implied
by an estimated multivariate representation of its spending components.
2.3.1 Empirical specifications
The specification of the multivariate model is given by the following VAR:
ln(st) =
p∑
j=1
Bj ln(st−j) + es,t, (2.24)
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Notes: The graph plots the true responses of yt = xt + zt to a one-time shock in ex,t,
and the response according to the AR(1) representation, which is the time series
representation of the most complex of the yt components. In panel A, ez,t = −0.9ex,t, in
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where st is a 5 × 1 vector containing the expenditure components, consumption, ct;
investment, it; government expenditures, gt; exports, xt; and imports. mt. The forecast
for yt+τ follows directly from
yt+τ ≡ eln(ct+τ ) + eln(it+τ ) + eln(gt+τ ) + eln(xt+τ ) − eln(mt+τ ). (2.25)
The estimated univariate representation for aggregate output is given by:16
ln(yt) =
p∑
j=1
aj ln(yt−j) + et. (2.26)
The time series for yt itself is also constructed using equation (2.25) so that we are
comparing like with like exactly. The key feature of the univariate time-series model is
that there is only one type of shock. If output turns out to be lower than expected, i.e.,
et < 0, then the predicted effect on future values of yt will always have the same pattern
with the magnitude proportional to the value of et.
Both time-series processes are estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). Given that
the variables could very well be integrated, it is important to add enough lags to ensure
that the shocks are stationary and spurious regression results are avoided. If the time
series are known to be integrated, then efficiency gains are possible by imposing this.
Additional restrictions can be imposed if the series are cointegrated. If these restrictions
are correct, but are not imposed, then the estimated parameter values will converge
towards the true parameter values at rate T , that is, there is superconsistency. If the
restrictions are not correct and are nevertheless imposed, then the system is misspec-
ified and the estimated system will not converge towards the true system. Because of
superconsistency, we prefer not to impose these types of restrictions on the system.
16We follow common practice and use four lags, unless stated otherwise. In appendix 2.B, we show
that the results are similar when the number of lags is chosen by AIC, although the associated long-
term forecasts are somewhat less precise. Results not reported here indicate that long-term forecasts
are substantially less precise if the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is used. All models in this
paper also include a constant and a linear-quadratic deterministic trend. Appendix 2.B also shows that
key results are very similar if no trend is included and when only a linear trend is included. Campbell
and Mankiw (1987) also consider ARMA representations, but the results are similar to those obtained
with AR representations. The only exception is when third-orderMA components are included, but the
authors point out that the implied impulse response functions of this specification are estimated very
imprecisely .
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Figure 2.3: Effect of the shock in the univariate representatino of US GDP
Notes: The graph plots the response of output following a one-standard-deviation
negative shock according to the univariate one-type-shock model.
2.3.2 Impulse response functions
The response of a negative one-standard-deviation shock to et on (the log of) US GDP,
i.e., the impulse response function (IRF), is displayed in figure 2.3.17 Even though the
specification in equation (2.26) does not impose a unit root and contains a quadratic de-
terministic trend, the estimated specification documents that the response to the shock
et is very persistent. It is exactly this type of result that underlies the argument of Camp-
bell and Mankiw (1987) that one should expect economic downturns to have permanent
effects.
If output is generated by the multivariate model, i.e., according to equations (2.24)
and (2.25), then there are five reduced-form shocks that result in a drop in output.
17See Appendix 2.A for further details on data sources. Whereas the forecasting exercise discussed in
the next section is based on real-time data, the results in this subsection are based on the full sample of
quarterly US data from 1947Q1 to 2015Q1. The results are very similar if the sample ends in 2006Q4 and
the financial crisis is, thus, excluded, except that the IRF of the “import” shock is then less persistent.
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Consequently, there are five impulse response functions (IRFs), that is, five different
ways in which output could respond. There are fierce debates in the economic literature
on how to interpret shocks, but the interpretation of the shocks is not important for
the point we want to make, that is, a model used to forecast GDP should allow for
different forecasting patterns. For convenience, we will label the reduced-form shocks
according to the dependent variable of the equation. For example, we will refer to ec,t
as the consumption shock, but this is just a label and not meant to hint at a structural
interpretation. The five IRFs are plotted in figure 2.4. The figure makes clear that
according to the multivariate model there are shocks that have an extremely persistent
impact on output. The figure also makes clear, however, that there are shocks that have
a transitory impact on output.
2.3.3 Relevance of the theoretical arguments for modelling US
GDP
The IRFs displayed in figure 2.4 indicate that several of the issues raised in section 2.2
could be relevant for forecasting US GDP using a univariate representation. The IRFs
indicate that some events have long lasting consequences and others do not. For example,
the “consumption shock” has a very persistent effect, but the “investment shock” and
the “export shock” do not. This means that the analysis of section 2.2.1 is relevant. That
is, since some components of US GDP are not stationary, the univariate representation
will imply that all shocks to GDP will have a long-lasting effect.
With a finite sample, it is more difficult to determine whether the relatively parsimonious
representation of GDP used here is the correct univariate representation. But the results
of section 2.2.2 may give some guidance on potential problems. We find that the inno-
vations of the components of GDP are positively correlated. As documented in figure
2.4, GDP consists of very persistent and not so persistent components. This resembles
the example displayed in the bottom panel of figure 2.2. In this example, the univariate
representation of the aggregate random variable overestimates the impact of shocks for
a long period (up to 30 quarters), but underestimates the very long consequences.
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Figure 2.4: Effect of reduced-form VAR shocks on US GDP
Notes: The graphs plot the predicted repsonses of output following a
one-standard-deviation shock in the indicated reduced-form VAR shock that leads to a
reduction in GDP.
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2.4 Forecasting US GDP with univariate and multi-
variate models
We use the univariate and the multivariate time-series models to forecast future GDP
levels. Forecasts are out-of-sample forecasts, because forecasts made at t∗ only use data
up to date t∗.18 We use the latest vintage of data for each forecast.
The left panel of figure 2.5 plots the average forecast error at different forecast horizons
according to the univariate and the multivariate time-series models. The figure shows
that the predictive power of the univariate model is just as good as that of the multivari-
ate model in terms of average forecast errors. This does, of course, not imply that there
are no multivariate models that outperform a univariate model. In fact, Stock and Wat-
son (2002) document that a forecasting model that uses indexes based on the principal
components of many economic variables outperforms autoregressive univariate for most
(but not all) variables. Nevertheless, the result is somewhat surprising. After all, the
IRFs of the expenditure components indicate that GDP has components characterized
by different persistence levels and the theoretical analysis indicated that there should be
advantages in constructing forecasts of the aggregate by combining the separate forecasts
of the components.
But average forecast errors may obscure some interesting patterns. In particular, the
multivariate model turns out to do substantially better in forecasting at longer forecast
horizons during recessions. The right panel of figure 2.5 shows forecast errors averaged
across the six US recessions starting with the 1973-75 recession. NBER dates are used to
determine whether a quarter falls in a recssion. The figure shows that the multivariate
model generates much better forecasts at higher forecasting horizons.
Since average forecasting errors of the two types of models are similar, there must be
periods when the univariate time-series model generates better forecasts. Interestingly,
that happens during “ordinary” times, when the economy is neither doing very well nor
18Strictly speaking, this is pseudo out-of-sample forecasting, since future data is available at each
forecasting point. We estimate specifications with two lags if they have fewer than 135 observations
and four lags otherwise. The exact cutoff point does not matter, but it is important to only use only
two lags at the early dates of our forecasting exercise, because the specifcations with four lags generate
strange forecasts, which is likely to be due to the low number of degrees of freedom. Note that four lags
means estimating 23 coefficients per equation.
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very poorly, but continues to grow at a steady pace. The estimated multivariate models
have fewer degrees of freedom and this seems to come at a cost during stable periods
when simple forecasting rules suffice.
For the UK, the two time-series model generate forecast errors of similar magnitude even
during economic downturns. The multivariate time-series model does generate more
accurate forecasts, however, at the troughs of recessions. Below, we will discuss in more
detail in which way UK recessions differ from US recessions.
2.5 Predictable US recoveries
In this section, we discuss in more detail the differences in forecasts of the univariate and
the multivariate times-series model made at the trough of recessions.
Explaining the figures. Figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 show the results for US recessions.
The vertical lines in each figure indicate the forecasting point. The thick solid line plots
the actual data. Each figure also plots the predicted growth path according to the two
time-series models and a deterministic time trend.19
1973-75 US recession. The top panel of figure 2.6 displays the results for the 1973-75
recession.20 Forecasts are made at the trough of the recession, 1975Q1. Forecasts from
the univariate one-type-shock model indicate that output losses will be very persistent.
Instead, there is a rapid recovery back to the long-term trend. Given that there are at
times persistent changes in GDP, the univariate representation will always reflect this
persistence to some extent.21 By contrast, the forecast based on the multivariate model
19The time trend shown in the figures is a linear trend estimated on the full sample of GDP and is
included as a point of reference. The linear-quadratic trends included in the univariate and multivariate
models are estimated up until t∗.
20Because we focus on out-of-sample forecasts, we have only 109 quarterly observations for forecasts
at the trough of this recession, which leaves few degrees of freedom when the VAR is estimated with the
default specification, that is, four lags for each of the five variables and a quadratic deterministic trend.
By using a VAR with only two lags for this recession, we avoid the strong sensitivity of forecasts when
the forecasting date shifts slightly.
21However, since we use an AR (4) to describe real output, our model does allow for a further pre-
dictable deterioration and/or for the possibility that (a large) part of the initial drop can be expected
to be reversed.
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captures the fast recovery of GDP after the trough of the recession. In addition to
the predicted short-term increase in growth rates, the multivariate model also captures
the subsequent return to normal growth rates. Not surprisingly, the path forecasted in
1973Q2 does not predict the recessions of the early eighties.
The exercise discussed here should not be considered as a horse race of two forecasting
models. What the results show is that (i) some economic downturns are followed by faster
than normal growth and seem to have little or no permanent effects and (ii) this type
of pattern is unlikely to be predicted by univariate representations, whereas multivariate
VARs do have the flexibility to capture this.
1980 US recession. The bottom panel of figure 2.6 displays results for the first reces-
sion of the early eighties. Forecasts are made at the trough, 1980Q3. Both models predict
that the shortfall of GDP relative to its trend value observed in 1980Q3 will remain of
roughly the same magnitude up till 1984. This means that both models miss the short-
lived pickup in growth rates just after 1980Q3 and both miss the second recession in the
early eighties. In 1984, the economy has recovered from the second recession, although
GDP is still below its trend value, and GDP is in fact close to the levels predicted by
both models using data up to 1980Q3.
The two 1980Q3 forecasts diverge in their predictions for the post-1984 period. The
1980Q3 forecast according to the univariate representation predicts that the gap between
GDP and its (ex-post) trend value will not become smaller. By contrast, the 1980Q3
forecast based on the multivariate model indicates that the gap will become smaller,
which is indeed what happened. In 1986, GDP was back to its trend value, which is in
line with the 1980Q3 prediction according to the multivariate model.
The recovery predicted by the multivariate model in 1980Q3 is quite different from the
recovery predicted in 1973Q2. Whereas, the multivariate model predicts a quick return
at the trough of the seventies recession, it predicts a much more gradual return at the
trough of the first early eighties recession.
1981-82 US recession. The top panel of figure 2.7 reports the results for the fore-
casting exercise when forecasts are made at the end of the second early-eighties reces-
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Figure 2.6: The 1973-5 and the 1980 US recessions
Notes: This figure plots the two forecasted time paths for US GDP together with the
realised values and a deterministic time trend. All four variables are relative to the
value of GDP at the forecasting date, which is indicated by the vertical line.
79
sion, 1982Q4. From this point onwards, the US economy recovers remarkably quickly.
Whereas the economy is almost 9% below its (ex-post) trend level at the end of 1982,
this gap is only 2.5% at the end of 1984 and only 1% at the end of 1985. The multivariate
model captures this remarkable recovery very well. It does not capture, however, the
fact that in subsequent years the gap gets even smaller. The univariate representation
completely misses the recovery and predicts, again, that ground lost during the recession
is permanent.
Both the behavior of GDP during this recession and the fact that the remarkable recovery
can be predicted by a simple time-series model strongly suggest that it is not always the
case that an unexpected change in real output of x percent should lead to a change of
the long-term forecast of x percent.
Although our multivariate model is a simple VAR, with five variables and four lags, it
allows for a rich set of dynamics. It is, therefore, not always easy to understand what fea-
tures of the data lead to particular predictions. For this particular period, it is possible
to point at the reason why the model predicts a sharp recovery. The period just before
1982Q4 is characterized by sharp drops in investment and exports. As documented in
figure 2.4, these correspond to temporary reductions in GDP. Consequently, the multi-
variate model predicts that these negative influences will disappear quickly. During 1982,
both consumption and government expenditures have started to grow already, which ac-
cording to figure 2.4 correspond to permanent positive changes in GDP. This is consistent
with the predicted persistence of the recovery.
1990-91 US recession. The bottom panel of figure 2.7 displays the results for the
recession of the early 1990s. The results differ from those reported above for previous
recessions in that now both models predict a permanent loss in GDP. Although the loss
in actual GDP is indeed very persistent and GDP does not get back to its trend level
until 1997, the actual loss is not permanent.
2001 US recession. The results for the early naughties recession are displayed in the
top panel of figure 2.8. During this recession, there is not a sharp contraction in output.
It is better characterized by a period of near zero growth rates. The recovery is also very
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Figure 2.7: The 1981-2 and the 1990-1 US recessions
Notes: This figure plots the two forecasted time paths for US GDP together with the
realised values and a deterministic time trend. All four variables are relative to the
value of GDP at the forecasting date, which is indicated by the vertical line.
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Figure 2.8: The 2001 and the great US recessions
Notes: This figure plots the two forecasted time paths for US GDP together with the
realised values and a deterministic time trend. All four variables are relative to the
value of GDP at the forecasting date, which is indicated by the vertical line.
gradual. The multivariate model is wrong in predicting a short-term pick up in growth
rates, but is correct in its longer-term forecast that the loss in GDP is not permanent.
The univariate representation predicts again that there will be no recovery, not in the
short term, which in this case is indeed what happened, and also not in the long term,
which is not what happened.
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US financial crisis, 2008-2009 The bottom panel of figure 2.8 plots the results for
the forecasts made in 2009Q2, when the sharp fall in GDP had come to a halt.22 Similar
to forecasts made in previous recessions, the multivariate model again predicts that part
of the loss in output relative to trend will be recovered in a couple years. Different
from forecasts made in previous recession is that the univariate now also predicts a
recovery. In fact, at this point in time, the univariate model predicts stronger long-term
growth than the multivariate model. Unfortunately, forecasts of both models were too
optimistic.
Starting in 2012, the multivariate model starts to predict the future reasonably well. In
particular, it correctly predicts that output loss relative to trend will not be reversed.23
The univariate representation remains more optimistic than the multivariate model until
the end of the sample, sometimes marginally more optimistic, but typically substan-
tially more optimistic. Using data up to the end of our sample, the univariate model
predicts that output in 2025 will be 1% below its extrapolated trend value whereas the
multivariate model predicts that the gap will be 4.5%.24
Why are forecasts made with a univariate model too pessimistic? In section
2.2, we gave two reasons why univariate representations could be too pessimistic regard-
ing the long-term impact of negative shocks. The common element in both reasons is
that it is difficult for a univariate representation to generate the best possible forecast
when the variable of interest is a sum of variables with different persistence.
The first reason focused on the case where the shocks affecting the aggregate where
different shocks. Even the correct univariate representation has only one shock and
would never be able to capture that there are actually multiple shocks that affect the
aggregate for different lengths of time. The second reason focused on the case where
the components are driven by the same shock, but the estimated univariate model is not
complex enough.
22At the beginning of the financial crisis, both time-series models wrongly predict that a substantial
part of the losses will be recaptured quickly. These results are not displayed in the graphs.
23These results are not displayed in the figures.
24The economy was substantially above its trend value before the crisis, which means that these long-
term predictions imply larger losses relative to the hypothetical case when there would have been no
financial crisis and subsequent average real output growth would have been equal to the trend growth
rate.
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Figure 2.4 showed that US GDP does consist of components with different degrees of
persistence. Moreover, shocks to these components are clearly correlated. Nevertheless,
we doubt that that the reason the univariate model generates different forecasts is that it
is not complex enough. Our results are robust to alternative specifications and resemble
those found in the literature for a variety of univariate representations. It seems more
plausible to us that US GDP is affected by different types of events which affect the US
economy for different durations. Univariate representations would not be able to capture
this.
2.6 Predictable UK recoveries?
UK recessions before the financial crisis. Post-war UK recessions are not as in-
teresting as US recessions. Instead of sharp contractions, like those observed for the US,
UK recessions were typically prolonged periods of low growth rates. Similarly, recoveries
were very gradual. Although the multivariate model has better long-term predictions
than the univariate representation in all but one of the recessions that occurred before
the financial crisis, the predictions of the two models are roughly similar. Moreover, fore-
casted paths are close to straight lines, which is not surprising given the shallow aspect
of economic downturns in the UK. The exception to these observations is the financial
crisis, which will be discussed next.
UK financial crisis, 2008-2010. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 plot the realizations of UK
GDP together with forecasts made by the two models at four different forecasting points.
First consider the two panels of figure 2.9, which plot the results when forecasts are made
at the middle of the period with large negative growth rates, 2008Q4, and at the end of
this period, 2009Q2.
In the middle of the period when GDP dropped sharply, the univariate representation
predicts an immediate and sustained return to positive growth rates. It is even somewhat
more optimistic than the prediction of a random walk model with drift in that it predicts
that GDP will grow faster than its trend in the next couple years, that is, it predicts that
part of the reduction of the pre-crisis positive gap between GDP and its trend value will
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Figure 2.9: Start and trough of the great UK recession
Notes: This figure plots the two forecasted time paths for US GDP together with the
realised values and a deterministic time trend. All four variables are relative to the
value of GDP at the forecasting date, which is indicated by the vertical line.
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Figure 2.10: Start and trough of the great UK recession
Notes: This figure plots the two forecasted time paths for US GDP together with the
realised values and a deterministic time trend. All four variables are relative to the
value of GDP at the forecasting date, which is indicated by the vertical line.
be recovered. By contrast, the multivariate model predicts that GDP will grow at rates
that are somewhat lower than the trend growth rate, which is closer to the observed
outcomes, although also too optimistic. In 2009Q2, the univariate representation still
predicts that GDP will end up substantially above its trend value. The multivariate
model forecasts that growth rates would be around zero for several quarters followed by
a very gradual recovery. These forecasts are slightly below the actual outcomes.
The two panels of figure 2.10 plot the results when forecasts are made in 2009Q3 and
2010Q1. Both of these quarters are in the period when the UK economy had just started
its recovery. For both forecasting points, the univariate representation’s predictions in-
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dicate that the economy will start growing at rates slightly higher than those observed
in the past so that it still predicts that part of the losses will be recovered. By con-
trast, the multivariate model—using data up to 2009Q3—predicts that there first will
be a period with low growth rates, which eventually is followed by a period of faster
growth rates. This is indeed what happened, although the predictions are a little bit too
pessimistic. Half a year later, in 2010Q1, the forecasts of the multivariate model have
improved somewhat and do a good job in predicting the subsequent development of UK
GDP.
We do not want to argue that the multivariate model is a remarkably good forecasting
model. Neither model does very well in predicting subsequent output growth during
this period, although it is worth noting that the multivariate model realizes quickly that
output losses will be very persistent. The point that we want to make is that multi-
variate models have the flexibility to predict different types of forecasting patterns. By
contrast, univariate representations are quite restrictive and may miss both predictable
recoveries and—as is shown here—a predictable deterioration during a downturn. The
main reason why the univariate representation is restrictive is that it has only one type
of shock. Since the GDP data used to estimate the univariate representation contains
a persistent component, changes in GDP will always lead to changes in the long-term
forecasts of the univariate model. Although, univariate forecasts always have a perma-
nent component, we allow for the possibility that short-term forecasts are different from
long-term forecasts, since our empirical univariate representation has four lags. But all of
our estimated univariate representations imply predictions that are quite close to those
of a random walk with drift.
2.7 Concluding comments
Macroeconomic forecasts are made with simple univariate models, for example, Campbell
and Mankiw (1987),25 as well as with advanced multivariate models, for example, Stock
and Watson (2002).
25More recently, Edge and Gurkaynak (2010) and Edge et al. (2010), show that the forecasting per-
formance of estimated DSGE models can be worse than a simple forecast of a constant output growth.
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In this paper, we reviewed reasons why univariate representations of a sum of random
variables could miss key predictable aspects of this random variables. In fact, even if
a random variable is a random walk, then that does not mean that there are no fore-
castable changes. In particular, if an aggregate consists of stationary and non-stationary
variables, then the univariate representation will indicate that all shocks have permanent
consequences even though that is, of course, not the case for shocks to the stationary
components. Moreover, the correct specification of an aggregate of random variables
could be quite complex. We argued that it might be better to estimate time-series mod-
els for the components and obtain forecasts for the aggregate by explicitly aggregating
the forecasts of the components.
Despite the empirical observation that US GDP consists of very persistent and less persis-
tent variables, the univariate and multivariate time-series model have similar forecasting
performance in terms of average forecast errors. Such a finding may explain why forecasts
based on univariate models are still taken seriously.
However, our simple multivariate time-series model clearly outperforms the univariate
model, when it is used to forecast future GDP during recessions. Whereas the univari-
ate model typically predicts that recessions have large and negative consequences, the
multivariate model often correctly predicts that this is not the case. In some cases, for
example, when the drop in GDP is mainly due to drops in components with less persis-
tence such as investment and exports, it was possible to understand why the multivariate
model performed better than the univariate model. In other cases it is not. Neverthe-
less, the sharply better performance of our simple multivariate model during recessions
and the theoretical discussion indicate that one should be careful making forecasts with
univariate time-series models.
One point that we do not address is the correct level of (dis)aggregation. Consumption
is the sum of non-durable and durable consumption and both are sums of individual
expenditures. So further disaggregation may lead to further improvements. It is not clear,
however, whether one should disaggregate to the lowest possible level, since sampling
variation typically increases when one considers disaggregated variables.
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2.A Data sources
US data. Data are downloaded from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis. They are (i) Consumption: real personal consumption expenditures; (FRED
code: PCECC96); (ii) Investment: real gross private domestic investment (GPDIC1);
(iii) Government expenditures: real government consumption expenditures & gross in-
vestment (GCEC1); (iv) Exports: real exports of goods & services (EXPGSC1); and (v)
Imports: real imports of goods & services (IMPGSC1). All time series are seasonally
adjusted quarterly data measured in billions of chained 2009 dollars. The data were last
updated May 29, 2015.
The GDP data used is the sum of the consumption, investment, government expendi-
tures, and exports minus imports. Adding up these real time series generates a time
series that is extremely close, but not exactly identical to the actual GDP data. Our
approach ensures that the components used in the multivariate model add up exactly to
the data used in the univariate model. This way, we avoid clutter by describing small
differences in the GDP data used in the two types of time-series models.
UK data. Data are from the Office of National Statistics. They are (i) household final
consumption expenditures (ONS code: ABJR) plus final consumption expenditure of
non-profit institutions serving households (HAYO); (ii) total gross fixed capital forma-
tion (NPQT); (iii) general government: Final consumption expenditures (NMRY); (iv)
balance of payments: Trade in goods and services: Total exports (IKBK); (v) Balance
of payments: Imports: Trade in Goods and services (YBIM). All data are seasonally
adjusted quarterly data and the base period is 2011. The GDP data used is the sum of
these five components. Investment in inventories are excluded, since they contain some
very volatile high frequency movements.
2.B Robustness
Figures 2.11 through 2.16 display the results for several robustness exercises. Figure 2.11
documents that our result that multivariate time-series models generate more accurate
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long-term forecasts than univariate models is also true when no deterministic trend term
is included, when only a linear trend term is included, and when the number of lags
are chosen by referenc to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Figures 2.12 through
2.16 illustrate that even the actual forecasts are very similar when the number of lags
are chosen with AIC. At the earlier forecasting dates, there is a bit of variation in the
number of lags chosen by AIC, especially for the univariate specification. After this, the
number of lags chosen for the univariate specification is three, which is one less than our
benchmark number. For the multivariate specification, the number of lags remains two
for a while and then jumps to five lags, one more than our benchmark number.
91
0 5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
m
ea
n 
ab
s. 
for
ec
as
t e
rro
r %
all quarters
no trend
0 5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
recession quarters
no trend
0 5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
m
ea
n 
ab
s. 
for
ec
as
t e
rro
r % linear trend
0 5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
linear trend
0 5 10 15 20
forecast horizon (quarters)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
m
ea
n 
ab
s. 
for
ec
as
t e
rro
r % lags chosen by AIC
0 5 10 15 20
forecast horizon (quarters)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
lags chosen by AIC
AR forecast
VAR forecast
Figure 2.11: Average forecast errors, USA - robustness
Notes: These graphs plot the average forecast errors of the indicated time series model.
NBER recession dates are used to determine whether a quarter is a ‘recession quarter’
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Figure 2.12: The 1973-5 and the 1980 US recessions-AIC
Notes: This figure plots the two forecasted time paths for US GDP together with the
realised values and a deterministic time trend. All four variables are relative to the
value of GDP at the forecasting date, which is indicated by the vertical line. Number of
lags chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Figure 2.13: The 1981-2 and the 1990-1 US recessions-AIC
Notes: This figure plots the two forecasted time paths for US GDP together with the
realised values and a deterministic time trend. All four variables are relative to the
value of GDP at the forecasting date, which is indicated by the vertical line. Number of
lags chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Figure 2.14: The 2001 and the great US recessions - AIC
Notes: This figure plots the two forecasted time paths for US GDP together with the
realised values and a deterministic time trend. All four variables are relative to the
value of GDP at the forecasting date, which is indicated by the vertical line. Number of
lags chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Figure 2.15: Start and trough of the great UK recession
Notes: This figure plots the two forecasted time paths for US GDP together with the
realised values and a deterministic time trend. All four variables are relative to the
value of GDP at the forecasting date, which is indicated by the vertical line. Number of
lags chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Figure 2.16: Start and trough of the great UK recession
Notes: This figure plots the two forecasted time paths for US GDP together with the
realised values and a deterministic time trend. All four variables are relative to the
value of GDP at the forecasting date, which is indicated by the vertical line. Number of
lags chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Chapter 3
Some Macroeconomic Consequences of
Macroprudential Liquidity
Regulation
3.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 has prompted a large overhaul of financial regulation, notably
in the regulation of banks. The new Basel III regulations make two important qualitative
changes. First, bank capital requirements, previously calculated with respect to risk-
weighted assets, would be supplemented with a simple leverage ratio (which compares
unweighted total assets with equity). Second, banks would have to hold a buffer of liquid
assets (the “Liquidity Coverage Ratio” or LCR) which would cover at least the next 30
days of maturing market liabilities, as well as some proportion of retail deposits.
There are good reasons for thinking that both of these measures would either reduce the
likelihood of a crisis in the financial sector, or reduce the severity of a crisis conditional
on one occurring. However, such regulation may also have implications for the ability of
banks to intermediate funds out of crisis periods. This is the question with which this
paper is concerned. To this end, I set up a macroeconomic model to examine the effects
(in general equilibrium) of changing liquidity regulation, which allows the effects of such
a change, including those on prices, to be gauged.
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I augment a standard neoclassical growth model with financial intermediaries similar to
the type proposed by Gertler and Karadi (2011), and subject them to a “risk-weighted
capital ratio” and a “liquidity ratio” which are meant to capture the essence of the most
recent round of financial regulation. I then describe the mechanisms through which
changing these constraints (though exogenous “policy”) can affect the rest of the economy,
which I term the “crowding out” channel and the “financial repression” channel. In the
absence of either of these, I establish a neutrality result which shows that changes in
liquidity regulation merely determine whether households hold bonds or bank deposits,
and have no effect on the wider economy.
The intuition for the “crowding out” channel is as follows: suppose we start in a situation
where banks have to adhere to a regulatory capital ratio which places a positive risk-
weight on government bonds. Then suppose a regulatory change is introduced (for now,
consider it to be unanticipated) such that banks are required to hold more of these bonds.
As a consequence, they will have to reduce the amount of other assets that they hold
for a given level of their own net worth. Over time, this change in the bank’s portfolio
mix will also typically reduce the rate at which banks accumulate net worth. This will
further reduce the amount of productive assets that they can intermediate, and hence
reduce the productive capital of the economy.
In contrast, the “financial repression” channel exists when banks earn a lower return
- net of transaction costs - on their holdings of government bonds than they pay on
their deposits. In this paper this is motivated by a positive resource cost of raising and
servicing deposits.1 As a consequence, forcing banks to hold more government bonds
will require them to raise more deposits, increasing the amount of the resource cost that
they have to pay and reducing the rate at which they accumulate net worth. This means
that over time, banks will not be able to intermediate as much physical capital, reducing
economy-wide output and consumption.
The neutrality result demonstrates that in the absence of either of these channels, the
level of the liquidity ratio will simply determine whether households or banks hold gov-
1In the data, the interest rates on overnight retail bank deposits are typically below the yield on gov-
ernment bonds, which may offset such costs. In this paper I abstract from this difference as government
bonds and bank deposits are both one period and riskless. It would be possible to extend the model to
add “deposits in the utility function”: in this case, the financial repression channel would still exist as
long as the resource cost was greater than the difference in the interest rate spread between bonds and
deposits.
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ernment bonds, and have no effect on intermediation of productivie assets and hence
other macroeconomic variables. This is true both in and out of steady state. This result
is principally illustrative, as under these conditions banks are indifferent between holding
any level of bonds financed out of deposits, and households treat bonds and deposits as
perfect substitutes.
One clear policy implication from this paper is that if regulators require banks to hold
liquid assets, these assets should not count towards capital or leverage ratios, to minimise
the “crowding out” channel. Risk-weighted capital requirements have been criticised as
allowing banks too much scope to “game” the regulatory system (for instance, see Admati
and Hellwig (2013)). But if liquidity buffers consist of assets mandated by the regulator in
any case, the scope for such gaming should be minimal, and would prevent the “crowding
out” channel in the data.
This policy implication appears to be at odds with the new Basel III framework, and
in particular the new “supplemental leverage ratio”, as liquid assets held for regulatory
reasons count towards this ratio. According to the Basel Committee’s 2012 report on the
implementation of the new framework, 56 of 209 global banks at the end of 2011 did not
satisfy the new leverage ratio. So for a subset of banks, tighter liquidity requirements
may lead to more “crowding out” of the type explained in this paper.2
The strength of the “financial repression” channel is harder to gauge. Insofar as banks
compensate the costs of providing deposit services with a lower interest rate on deposits,
a lower interest rate spread between government bonds and deposits (for example, due
to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates) may make this channel stronger. It
would be better to assess the costs of deposit servicing separately, but this is a question
for future research.
After discussing related literature, Section 3.2 describes the model. Section 3.3 discusses
the conditions under which the “neutrality result” discussed above holds. Section 3.4 ex-
amines comparative statics of the model in steady state, while section 3.5 calibrates the
model and presents some numerical results showing comparative statics and the transi-
tional dynamics between regulatory regimes following a tightening of liquidity regulation.
2See: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs231.pdf. In the same report, 86% of LCR-eligible assets held by
the 209 banks had a risk-weight of zero, so the “crowding out” channel would not appear to come from
the risk-weighted capital requirements which were used under Basel II.
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Section 3.6 concludes.
3.1.1 Related Literature
This paper uses financial intermediaries of the type developed and used by Mark Gertler,
Peter Karadi and Nobu Kiyotaki in a number of papers (Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013)
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler et al. (2012) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2013)).
Of these, Gertler and Karadi (2013) is the closest to this paper from this strand of
the literature, as it introduces a second asset (a long term government bond) to the
Gertler and Karadi (2011) setup to study the effect of quantitative easing on the balance
sheets of financial intermediaries. This paper is similar in that I also take Gertler-
Karadi-Kiyotaki style financial intermediaries and add a second asset. However, this
paper differs in three important ways. First, I substitute the “stealing” constraint facing
financial intermediaries with a constraint designed to be interpreted as a risk-weighted
capital ratio. This relates “risk-weighted assets” to bank net worth each period. Second,
in this paper, banks also face a “liquidity ratio” or “reserve requirement”. Thirdly, the
second asset I include is a one-period government bond rather than a perpetuity. These
changes allow for clearer results from comparative statics and also a clearer interpretation
of the constraints.
The literature between financial regulation and macroeconomics has grown quickly since
the financial crisis. There are a series of papers which look at the interaction between
bank capital regulation, monetary policy and economic outcomes. These include An-
geloni and Faia (2013), Farhi and Werning (2013) and Nuño and Thomas (2013). There
is also a literature which examines liquidity and banking from a finite-horizon, partial
equilibrium perspective. Notable recent contributions include Acharya et al. (2011),
Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) and Allen et al. (2009).
There is a much smaller literature focusing on the effect of liquidity regulation on the
financial sector. Particularly of note are papers by Goodhart et al. (2012) and Adrian
and Boyarchenko (2013). Of these, the latter is most similar in spirit to this paper, in
that it focuses on the same measure of liquidity (the Liquidity Coverage Ratio). Adrian
and Boyarchenko (2013)) augment a continuous-time macro-finance model with financial
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intermediaries which are also subject to ad hoc capital and liquidity requirements. In
their model, intermediaries can endogenously default. Their numerical results suggest
that “tight” liquidity requirements and “loose” capital requirements typically maximise
consumer welfare, as there is a stronger tradeoff between capital requirements and house-
hold consumption out of crisis periods than liquidity regulation. The paper by Goodhart
et al. focuses on the welfare implications of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), an-
other addition to Basel III which attempts to manage liquidity of financial intermediaries
over longer time horizons. They find that the NSFR can be a useful tool in improving
consumer welfare.
Finally, there is a somewhat older literature which looks at the effectiveness of reserve
requirements - which are similar to the recent liquidity regulations - as ways for the
government to reduce their effective interest burden. Using an overlapping generation
model of banks, Freeman (1987) shows that reserve requirements are typically worse
from a welfare point of view than a tax on deposits, due in part to the “crowding out”
of capital that reserve requirements imply.
3.2 Model Environment
3.2.1 Banking sector
The banking sector in this model is similar to that in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and
subsequent papers. Banks have net worth nt and raise deposits from households. With
this they purchase capital (which they rent to firms) and one-period government bonds.
In each period, bankers ‘die’ at rate 1−σ, where the survival probability σ is low enough
such that bankers are constrained by their net worth around the steady state.
Formally an individual bank’s problem is:
max
{bbt+i,dbt+i,kbt+i}∞i=0
Et
[ ∞∑
i=1
Λt,t+i(1− σ)σi−1nt+i
]
subject to (∀t):
nt = R
k
t qt−1k
b
t−1 +R
f
t−1b
b
t−1 − (Rdt−1 + δc)dbt−1, (3.1)
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qtk
b
t + b
b
t = nt + d
b
t , (3.2)
qtk
b
t + χb
b
t ≤ φnt, (3.3)
bbt ≥ pidbt , (3.4)
where bbt , dbt , kbt correspond to bond holdings, deposit liabilities and holidings of physical
capital, respectively.3 nt is the bank’s equity at t. Rkt , R
f
t , R
d
t correspond to the gross
rate of return on physical capital, bonds and deposits respectively, and qt is the price of
capital at t.
The bank’s objective is to maximise the terminal value of nt upon exit in terms of
the marginal utility of households (as most of exiting bank net worth is redistributed
lump-sum to households, and so net worth is discounted using the household’s stochastic
discount factor Λ, defined in the next section). Bank net worth evolves according to (3.1)
and bank portfolio choices must be consistent with their period balance sheet constraint
(3.2). (3.1) states that bank net worth at t is equal to the gross return from assets less
the cost of repaying deposits. The gross return from bonds and deposits will come from
the household’s problem, and the gross return on capital is defined as:
Rkt =
rkt + (1− δ)qt
qt−1
, (3.5)
where rkt is the rental rate on capital and δ is the depreciation rate. The only non-
standard part of these constraints is the fact that I allow banks to face a period cost of
raising deposits (δc). This reflects costs of raising and managing deposits, and I assume
it is linear in the amount of deposits raised.
However, this paper deviates from the Gertler-Karadi-Kiyotaki model by assuming that
banks face a regulatory capital ratio (equation (3.3)) rather than a stealing constraint.
This constraint states that the risk-weighted sum of assets can be no greater than some
multiple of net worth. Here, the parameter χ∈[0, 1] is analagous to the “risk-weight”
applied to government bonds. χ = 1 is analagous to a simple leverage ratio, while χ = 0
3The superscript ’b’ refers to the fact that the variable pertains to banks, so kbt is holdings of physical
capital by banks at time t.
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is equivalent to a zero risk-weight on government bonds. Implicitly, the risk weight on
physical capital is normalised to one - this need not be the case in practice but then the
“leverage” parameter φ would need to be adjusted accordingly.
The final constraint (3.4) is a liquidity ratio or reserve requirement: it states that banks
have to hold liquid assets in proportion to their deposits. The proportion is determined
by the parameter pi. This is a simple way of attempting to construct a constraint in
the spirit of Basel III’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). Strictly speaking, the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio would set pi = 1 for all market debt coming due in the next 30 days and
zero for all other market debt.4 However, in this model both deposits and government
bonds have a one period maturity. A richer model would allow for variation of bank
liability by (i) type and (ii) maturity. In this framework we abstract from this for
simplicity.
The rationale for setting up the bank’s problem with (3.3) and (3.4) rather than a stealing
constraint consistent with Gertler and Karadi (2013) is twofold. First, the purpose of
this paper is to attempt to clarify the effect of financial regulation (in particular, liquidity
regulation) on the macroeconomy. (3.3) and (3.4) have a clear interpretation in terms
of regulation. The second reason is that this particular setup will give clean results in
terms of the comparative statics.
Solution to the bank’s problem
Define the cost to the bank of raising a unit of deposits R˜dt = Rdt + δc. The following
proposition characterises the solution to the banks problem:
Proposition 1 If pi ≥ 0 and χ ≥ 0, and if banks take prices (Rkt+1, Rft , R˜dt ) as given,
banks maximise their present discounted value of net worth subject to (3.1)-(3.4) and if
the following conditions hold in period t:
(1− pi)Et
[
Rkt+1
]
+ pi(Rft ) ≥ R˜dt , (3.6)
χ(Et
[
Rkt+1
]− R˜dt ) ≥ (Rft − R˜dt ), (3.7)
4Retail deposits are assumed to have a low “runoff” rate, with pi = 0.05 or pi = 0.10 depending on
their type. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013) for details
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then the regulatory capital ratio (3.3) and the liquidity ratio (3.4) bind.5
Proof: See Appendix 3.A.1
Condition (3.6) states that the weighted return on assets for a bank is at least as great
as the cost of deposits. If this holds, then it then it will be optimal for the bank to hold
as many (risk-weighted) assets as possible, and (3.3) will bind.6
Similarly, the second condition (3.7) implies that - holding constant risk-weighted assets
(qtk
b
t +χb
b
t) - banks will always choose to hold as few government bonds as possible, and
hence (3.4) will bind. Intuitively, selling a bond and repaying a deposit will reduce risk-
weighted assets by χ and returns by (Rft − R˜dt ). To keep risk weighted assets constant,
the bank can raise some deposits and buy χ units of physical capital, on which they will
earn the (expected) return (Et
[
Rkt+1
] − R˜dt ). Under condition (3.7), this swap will not
decrease the banks returns (and will increase it if the inequality is strict).
In what follows we always assume that conditions (3.6) and (3.7) are satisfied. This is
reasonable as regulations are set in the real world to influence bank behaviour, and in
this model this is achieved through the regulatory constraints being binding.7,8
Given this, the constraints (3.2)-(3.4) will bind and mechanically will solve for the optimal
kbt , b
b
t , d
b
t . Note that the bank’s policy functions will be linear in their nt, which will allow
aggregation. In particular, the policy functions are given by:
qtk
b
t = ψ
knt =
φ(1− pi) + piχ
1− pi + piχ nt, (3.8)
bbt = ψ
bnt =
pi(φ− 1)
1− pi + piχnt, (3.9)
dbt = ψ
dnt =
φ− 1
1− pi + piχnt, (3.10)
5Note that (3.6) and (3.7) are weak inequalities. If they hold exactly, it is also possible for the bank
to set (bbt , dbt , kbt ) such that (3.3) and/or (3.4) don’t bind without reducing their objective function. In
these boundary cases, I assume that the bank chooses (bbt , dbt , kbt ) such that (3.3) and (3.4) bind.
6I show in the appendix that (3.6) and (3.7) together imply that the leverage ratio (3.3) binds even
if the liquidity ratio (3.4) doesn’t.
7If risk was added to the model and there was a penalty for breaching the requirements, it would be
the case that the requirements would matter even if they did not normally bind.
8 Additional evidence that current regulations bind can be seen from the large excess returns of
Bank stocks following the unexpected victory of President Trump in November 2016, as documented by
Wagner et al. (2017). Much of the financial reporting at the time focussed on the possible relaxation of
post-financial crisis regulation which was seen to impede bank profitability.
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Examination of these policy functions already hint at the effect of different policies -
higher pi appears to lead to more bonds being held by banks and less capital, for instance
- but this ignores the general equilibrium effects of changing each parameter on bank net
worth in equilibrium. To examine the effect of changing parameters we first have to set
out the remainder of the model.
3.2.2 Household sector
Households supply labour inelastically, consume and save in one of three assets - bank de-
posits, government bonds, and physical capital (which they rent to firms). Importantly,
households incur a management cost each period for holding physical capital. Formally,
the household’s problem is:
max
{ct+i,bht+i,dht+i,kht+i}∞i=0
Et
[ ∞∑
i=0
βiu(ct+i)
]
subject to a budget constraint and “no-shorting” contstraints, ∀t:
ct+b
h
t +d
h
t +qtk
h
t +f(k
h
t ) = wt+R
f
t−1b
h
t−1+R
d
t−1d
h
t−1+R
k
t qt−1k
h
t−1−Tt+pibt+pift +pikt , (3.11)
dbt ≥ 0, (3.12)
kbt ≥ 0, (3.13)
Here, ct is household consumption, bht , dht , kht are household holdings of government bonds,
bank deposits and physical capital respectively. Labour income is denoted by wt, lump
sum taxes by Tt, and (pibt , pi
f
t , pi
k
t ) are profits remitted to households by banks, final good
firms and capital producing firms respectively. pift will be zero in every period in this
model, and pikt will be zero in steady state.
The household’s problem yields the following first order conditions:
1 = Et [Λt,t+1]Rft , (3.14)
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1 = Et [Λt,t+1]Rdt , (3.15)
1 + f ′(kht ) = Et
[
Λt,t+1R
k
t+1
]
, (3.16)
where Λt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor between t and t+1:
Λt,t+1 =
βu′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
, (3.17)
It is clear from (3.14) and (3.15) that households treat government bonds and bank
deposits as perfect substitutes, and so a necessary condition for households to hold both
is that Rdt = R
f
t . The expected return on physical capital adjusted for aggregate risk
and net of the marginal management costs f ′(kht ) must also equal the risk free rate if the
household holds positive amounts of each asset in equilibrium.
The function f(.) is strictly increasing and convex in the capital held by each household.
It ensures that banks have a role in this economy - without it, banks would be as
efficient as households in intermediating capital, and hence banks would have no role9.
For numerical applications of the model in Section 4 onward, I will need to specify a
functional form for f(.):
f(kht ) =
γh
2
(kht − k
h
)2 (3.18)
where kh is a parameter governing how much of the capital stock households are allowed
to hold costlessly.
3.2.3 Final good firms
Final good firms hire labour from households and rent capital from households and banks.
They have a constant returns to scale production function which ensures that capital is
paid its marginal product and labour is paid the remaining revenue. These firms make
zero profit period by period. Formally their period problem is:
max
kft ,l
f
t
pift = zt(k
f
t )
α(lft )
(1−α) − rkt kft − wtlft
9Note that this function can be parameterised to nest the case in which households hold no capital
at all.
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The first order conditions for this problem, together with the fact that lft = 1 in equilib-
rium imply that:
rkt = αzt(k
f
t )
α−1, and (3.19)
wt = (1− α)zt(kft )α. (3.20)
3.2.4 Capital producing firms
The capital producing firms in this economy are the same as that in Gertler and Karadi
(2011). There are convex adjustment costs in net investment, which allows the price
of capital to deviate from unity out of steady state. At the end of each period, capital
producing firms purchase capital from households and banks, and then repair depreciated
capital and build new capital, which they sell at price qt.
Net investment and investment are defined as:
Int = (K
b
t +K
h
t )− (Kbt−1 +Kht−1), (3.21)
It = (K
b
t +K
h
t )− (1− δ)(Kbt−1 +Kht−1), (3.22)
whereKbt andKht are aggregate capital stocks held by banks and households, respectively,
and steady state investment is denoted by ISS. The fact that the flow adjustment cost
depends on net investment ensures that the capital decision is independent of the market
price of capital. The problem of capital producing firms is:
max
Int
Et
[ ∞∑
i=0
Λt,t+i
(
(qt+i − 1)Int+i − g(xt+i)(Int+i + ISS)
)]
,
where g(.) is a convex adjustment cost in the flow of net investment, such that g(1) =
g′(1) = 0, g′(.) > 0 and g′′(.) > 0, and xt+i =
Int+i+I
SS
Int−1+i+ISS
. This problem gives the following
first order condition:
qt = 1 + g(xt) + xtg
′(xt)− Et
[
Λt,t+1x
2
t+1g
′(xt+1)
]
. (3.23)
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These firms make zero profit in steady state, as qSSt = 1. Profits made out of steady
state are rebated lump sum to households, and are defined by:
pikt =
(
(qt − 1)Int − g(xt)(Int + ISS)
)
.
3.2.5 Government
The government levies lump sum taxes Tt on households, and uses it to fund a constant
amount of wasteful spending proportional to steady-state output (gY SS ) and service
the interest on its outstanding stock of debt (Bt). The government’s budget constraint
is given by:
g +Rft−1Bt−1 = Bt + Tt. (3.24)
As taxes are lump sum the timing of taxes is not important to analysis of the model.
However, to specify a path for Tt I assume that the government sets taxes with the
following rule:
Tt = g + ψg(Bt −BSS), (3.25)
where ψg > 0 is a parameter and BSS is the government debt level in the non-stochastic
steady state.10
3.2.6 Market Clearing and Aggregation
As the policy functions for banks (3.8)-(3.10) are linear in net worth, we can sum over
all banks such that:
Kbt = ψ
kNt,
Bbt = ψ
bNt,
Dbt = ψ
dNt,
10Note that throughout this paper I assume that parameters and shocks are such that Bbt < Bt. I
could relax this if I allow the household sector to short government bonds.
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Where uppercase letters represent aggregate variables corresponding to the relevant low-
ercase symbol. In each period fraction 1−σ of banks are forced to exit. Their net worth
on exiting is split between two sources: (most) is rebated lump-sum to households but
some is transferred to entering banks of mass 1−σ (so that the mass of banks remains at
unity over time). To be precise, profits rebated to households and transfers to entering
banks respectively are:
pibt = (1− σ)[Rkt qt−1Kbt−1 +Rft−1Bbt−1 − (Rdt−1 + δc)Dt−1]−Nnewt , (3.26)
Nnewt = ωφNt−1. (3.27)
Hence, the equation of motion for aggregate banking sector net worth is given by:
Nt = σ[R
k
t qt−1K
b
t−1 +R
f
t−1B
b
t−1 − (Rdt−1 + δc)Dt−1] + ωφNt−1, (3.28)
where ω is a parameter denoting how much of the assets of exiting banks are remitted
to entering banks. The market clearing conditions in the capital, government bond and
deposit markets respectively are:
Kft = K
b
t−1 +K
h
t−1, (3.29)
Bt = B
b
t +B
h
t , (3.30)
Dbt = D
h
t . (3.31)
Finally, aggregate output and the resource constraint are given by:
Yt = zt(K
f
t )
α, (3.32)
Yt = Ct + It + g + f(k
h
t ) + δcD
b
t , (3.33)
where log(zt) follows an AR(1) process with persistence parameter ρz.
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3.3 A neutrality result
Proposition 2 If pi ∈ [0, 1) and (3.6) and (3.7) are satisfied, and χ = 0 and δc = 0 then
changes in the required liquidity ratio, pi, alter bbt , bht , and dbt = dht but have no effect on
the rest of the economy.
Proof: See Appendix 3.A.2
This neutrality result is interesting as under certain conditions it shows that changes in
bank liquidity regulation need not have an effect on the wider economy, even in a model in
which banks (i) are constrained by their net worth, and (ii) are better in intermediating
capital than households. By studying changes which violate this neutrality result (in
particular, allowing the “risk-weight” on bonds to be positive χ > 0 or by assuming that
banks find it costly to raise deposits δc > 0) we can get a sense about the mechanisms
through which liquidity regulation may affect the wider economy.11
To get some intuition behind this result consider the representative bank’s constraints
(3.1)-(3.4):
nt = R
k
t qt−1k
b
t−1 +R
f
t−1b
b
t−1 − (Rdt−1 + δc)dbt−1,
qtk
b
t + b
b
t = nt + d
b
t ,
qtk
b
t + χb
b
t = φnt,
bbt = pid
b
t ,
where we assume that the conditions stipulated in Proposition 1 hold and so the two
inequality constraints bind. Now consider an increase in pi. For a fixed amount of
deposits (dbt) the bank would have to buy bonds - which would mean selling some physical
capital. However, if pi < 1 then banks can also adjust to the higher liquidity requirement
by raising deposits and using purchasing additional bonds, without selling any physical
capital. If χ = 0 then bonds have a zero risk weight, and so banks can buy bonds
without increasing their risk-weighted assets - and as such, they don’t have to reduce
their holdings of physical capital. If in addition, δc = 0 (banks don’t face a resource cost
in raising deposits), then increasing deposits and bonds one for one does not alter the
11It may be worth noting that under the neutrality result, banks are indifferent to the amount of
government bonds they hold. As such, this case may not be realistic, but may still help understanding
of the mechanisms involved.
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rate at which banks accumulate net worth either. In this case, then, changing pi does
not alter anything apart from the size of the bank’s balance sheet.
As the model is in general equilibrium, the neutrality result goes through only because
households treat government bonds and bank deposits as perfect substitutes. As such,
the banking system as a whole faces a perfectly elastic supply curve of bonds and bank
deposits, and this is true even if the aggregate supply of bonds is held constant. If
households did not treat bonds and deposits as perfect substitutes, then changes in pi
(which alter the amount of deposits and bonds that households hold in equilibrium)
would have to be compensated by changes in their relative returns. In particular, higher
pi would require households to hold fewer bonds and more deposits in equilibrium. This
would require Rd to increase relative to Rf if bonds and deposits were less than perfect
substitutes. Hence extending this model to allow deposits to enter the utility function
(for instance) would mean that this result would not in general be preserved.
The idea behind the proof is that in general, the equations of the model detailed in
Section 3.2 need to be solved as a system. However, if χ = 0 and if δc = 0 we can show
that this system reduces into two “blocks”: each containing a subset of the equations
listed above. Crucially, the system can now be solved recursively, with the first block
solved without reference to the second. As the parameter pi only appears in the second
block, then it will only affect variables in this block. The second block contains three
equations which pin down three variables (bbt , bht , and db = dht ), which correspond to the
representative household’s holdings of bonds and deposits. If either χ > 0 or if δc > 0
then at least one of these three variables will appear in the first “block” (in the equations
relating to the bank’s constraints) and hence this recursive structure will be broken.
3.4 Comparative Statics
The principal purpose of this paper is to construct a theoretical framework for analysing
the macroeconomic consequences of liquidity regulation. To this end, I first use compar-
ative statics to illustrate how the endogenous variables in the model respond to changes
in the parameter pi (which determines the amount of government bonds that banks have
to hold as a fraction of deposits).
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3.4.1 Parameter restrictions
In steady state, the prices Rk, Rf and Rd will be known functions of parameters. To
ensure that the representative bank will still find it optimal for their regulatory capital
ratio (3.3) and their liquidity ratio (3.4) to bind, I now place weak assumptions on
parameters which (i) will ensure that the conditions for Proposition 1 will be satisfied,
which will pin down bank behaviour; and (ii) will allow interpretation of some of the
results of this section.
Assumption A1: Restrictions on parameters (Interpretation)
(i) φ > 1: Banks can raise a postive amount of deposits
(ii) pi ∈ [0, 1): Banks are not required to hold more bonds than the amount of deposits
they raise
(iii) χ ∈ [0, 1]: The “risk-weight” on government bonds in the bank’s “capital ratio”
constraint (3.3) is no greater than the “risk-weight” on physical capital.
(iv) δc ≥ 0: The resource cost of raising deposits is non-negative.
(v) 1−ωφ
σ
≥ 1
β
+ δc
1
1−pi : the steady state rate of net worth accumulation for the banking
sector is sufficiently high. This condition is necessary for banks to want to raise
deposits.
Conditions A1(i)-(iv) have natural interpretations and ensure that banks ‘look like’ those
in reality, by raising deposits, holding some fraction of these in liquid assets and so on.
I show in Appendix 3.A.3 that together with these, additionally assuming A1(v) will be
sufficient to ensure that the two condtions needed for banks to want to raise deposits
((3.6) and (3.7)) are satisfied and that the bank is optimising when both the regulatory
capital ratio (3.3) and the liquidity ratio (3.4) bind. This last condition ensures the rate
of return on the portfolio of bank assets are higher that the return on deposits (inclusive
of any management costs, δc) which is a necessary condition for banks to want to raise
deposits and not simply invest out of their net worth.
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3.4.2 Evaluating the steady state
In the steady state of this model, productivity z is a constant and labour is supplied
inelastically so changes in output will come from a change in the aggregate capital stock
Kf . By the representative final good firm’s first order condition (3.19), the amount of
capital in steady state must be consistent with the rental rate of capital rk and hence the
gross return on physical capital Rk (by (3.5), which adjusts the rental rate by depreciation
and changes in the price of physical capital) . Hence to conduct a comparative statics
exercise of changing one parameter on output, we must first find how that parameter
affects Rk. First, note that (3.28) and the bank policy functions (3.8)-(3.10) imply:
Nt = σ[R
k
tψ
k +Rft−1ψ
b − (Rdt−1 + δc)ψd]Nt−1 + ωφNt−1,
In the non-stochastic steady state where N is constant, this can be written:
1− ωφ
σ
= [Rkψk +Rfψb − (R˜d)ψd], (3.34)
Where the right-hand side of this expression are the parameters that pin down the steady-
state return on equity of a bank which survives (i.e. isn’t forced to exit). The consumer’s
first order conditions pin down the return on deposits and bonds as follows:
Rf =
1
β
, and (3.35)
R˜d =
1
β
+ δc. (3.36)
The steady state Rk is implicitly defined by (3.34). This states that the return on capital
- and hence the rental rate to capital - in steady state must be such that the aggregate
net worth of the banking sector is constant. This is conditional on the return on bond
and deposits given by the household’s first-order conditions.
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3.4.3 Effect of a change in the liquidity ratio parameter (pi) on
the steady state return on physical capital (Rk)
By rearranging (3.34) and differentiating we obtain the following expression describing
how the return on capital changes as a function of changes in the required liquidity ratio
in steady state:
dRk
dpi
=
φ− 1
(φ(1− pi) + piχ)2
[(
1− ωφ
σ
− 1
β
− δc
)
χ+ δcφ
]
. (3.37)
By examining the expression (3.37) we can see that under A1 dRk
dpi
≥ 0.12 This states
that increasing the liquidity ratio of banks will never reduce the steady state return of
captial. The following two channels can be seen clearly in (3.37):
• There is a possible “crowding out” effect, corresponding to the first term inside
the square brackets in (3.37). If χ > 0 then increasing the amount of bonds that
banks have to hold reduces the amount of capital they can finance for a given
amount of net worth. Over time, holding less capital will erode the rate at which
surviving banks accrue net worth as well.
• There is also a “financial repression” effect: if δc > 0 then a higher pi reduces the
rate at which surviving banks accrue net worth in steady-state. This is because
more deposits are having to fund government bonds which have a lower return than
the cost to the bank of raising deposits.
We can also see that these two channels interact to dampen the effect of the other (so
that if both “crowding out” and “financial repression” are present the overall effect on Rk
is less than the sum of the two effects individually). Taking the cross partial derivative
of the above expression with respect to χ and δc:
∂2
∂χ∂δc
dRk
dpi
= − φ− 1
(φ(1− pi) + piχ)2
[
1 + 2
(φ− χ)pi
(φ(1− pi) + piχ)
]
. (3.38)
This expression is strictly negative, which implies that the rate at which an increase in one
12The first term in (3.37) is positive by A1(i). In the square brackets, the first term is non-negative
by A1(ii), A1(iii) and A1(v); while the second term is non-negative by A1(i) and A1(iv).
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of (χ, δc) increases the steady state sensitivity of the cost of capital to the liquidity ratio
parameter is decreasing in the level of the other. The intuition behind this “dampening”
is that a higher value of χ reduces the amount of additional deposits which can be raised
to in response to an increase in pi, which in turn reduces the effect that a higher δc has
on deposits.
Note also that we can clearly see the neutrality result discussed above in (3.37): χ = δc =
0 is clearly a sufficient condition for dRk
dpi
= 0. Together with the additional assumption
that:
1− ωφ
σ
>
1
β
(which rules out the case when Rk = Rd = Rf ), χ = δc = 0 is both necessary and
sufficient for changes in pi to be neutral with respect to the real economy.
3.4.4 Effect of a change in the liquidity ratio parameter (pi) on
steady state bank net worth (N)
Combining (3.8) and (3.29) gives:
kf − kh = ψkN. (3.39)
We can think of the right-hand side of this expression as the supply of physical capital
held by banks, with the left-hand side as firm demand for physical capital net of household
supply. Totally differentiating this with respect to pi:
[
dkf
dRk
− dk
h
dRk
]
dRk
dpi
=
dψk
dpi
N + ψk
dN
dpi
(3.40)
From (3.5), (3.19), it is straightforward that dkf
dRk
< 0 - that a higher equilibrium re-
turn on capital implies less physical capital in steady state. Similarly, from (3.16) it is
straightforward to infer that dkf
dRk
> 0 - a higher Rk means that households will hold more
capital as they are able to bear a higher management cost. As from Proposition 2 we
know that dRk
dpi
≥ 0 we know that the left-hand side of (3.39) is non-increasing in pi.
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Turning to the right-hand side of (3.39):
dψk
dpi
= − (φ− 1)χ
(1− pi + piχ)2 ≤ 0
Together with the above result, this indicates that the sign of dN
dpi
is ambiguous under A1.
Putting aside the case of neutrality for the moment, higher pi will increase Rk, which will
reduce the demand for physical capital held by banks, which would indicate that there
would be a lower N in steady state. But a higher pi directly affects the amount of k that
banks can hold for a given amount of N . Which of these two effects dominates is not
clear for general parameter values.
Under A1, there are two special cases of note:
• dN
dpi
= 0 if χ = δc = 0. Under these parameter values dR
k
dpi
= 0. Note also that
χ = 0 =⇒ dψk
dpi
= 0
• dN
dpi
< 0 if χ = 0 and δc > 0. Under these parameter values: dR
k
dpi
> 0. As
χ = 0 =⇒ dψk
dpi
= 0
The first of these cases corresponds exactly to the neutrality result discussed above. The
second case shows that if we deviate from the neutrality case by introducing a resource
cost of raising deposits (but leaving the risk-weight on bonds at zero) then N would
decrease if pi rises, as the extra deposits needed to fund higher b would be more costly
than the return on that b.
3.4.5 Effect of a change in pi on steady state output and con-
sumption
The aggregate resource constraint in steady state can be written:
Y = C + I + g + f(kh) + δcD
b
Note that Y = (Kf )α. In turn, Kf is determined by Rk. Hence, changes in pi (the
liquidity ratio) will impact output only though changes in the return on capital, and
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hence the steady state capital stock.
It is also the case that I = δKf and Db = ψdN so, substituting these expressions into
the resource constraint and differentiating:
dC
dpi
= (
dY
dKf
− dI
dKf
)
dKf
dRk
dRk
dpi
− f ′(kh) dk
h
dRk
dRk
dpi
− δc(dψ
d
dpi
N + ψd
dN
dpi
)
= (α(Kf )α−1 − δ)dK
f
dRk
dRk
dpi
− f ′(kh) dk
h
dRk
dRk
dpi
− δcdψ
d
dpi
N − δcψddN
dpi
(3.41)
Note that the first term is non-positive - the term inside parentheses must be positive
under A1(v) given the definition of Rk. From proposition 2 we know that dRk
dpi
≥ 0 and
the firm’s first order condition implies that dKf
dRk
< 0.
The second term represents the increase in management costs paid by households as a
consequence of the change in pi. Again, it is non-positive, and strictly negative if dRk
dpi
> 0.
Intuitively, if an increase in Rk induces households to hold more capital, which means
they pay a higher resource cost.
The fourth term reflects the increase in the resource costs of raising deposits for a given
amount of N. This term is also non-positive, and strictly negative if δc > 0 and χ < 1.
χ < 1 is a sufficient condition for dψ
d
dpi
= (φ−1)(1−χ)
(1−pi+piχ)2 > 0.
The final term is the change in the resource cost of raising deposits as a consequence of
a change in steady state N. This term is of ambiguous sign. It is therefore possible that
an increase in pi can raise aggregate consumption (as higher pi may reduce the amount
of deposits held, and hence the amount of resources which need to be spent on raising
deposits).
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3.4.6 Comparative statics: conclusion
To sum up, in cases where the neutrality result doesn’t hold, increases in the liquidity
ratio pi will raise the rate of return on physical capital (and hence the rental rate of
capital) in steady state. This will directly lead to lower levels of output. This is even the
case if steady state bank net worth increases (bank net worth may increase in steady state,
depending on the relative strength of the “crowding out” and the “financial repression”
channel).
Household consumption may fall by more than the fall in output, particularly if the
increase in pi leads to households holding a larger share of the capital stock (on which
they have to pay a higher management cost). Against this, a lower steady state capital
stock implies less investment is needed in steady state. In addition, if bank net worth
falls it may be that the amount of deposits in steady state falls as well, which means that
amount of resources spent by banks raising deposits will fall. These two effects act in
the opposite direction to the higher management costs paid by households, which means
that the fall in consumption may be either greater or smaller than the steady state fall
in output.
3.5 Numerical Analysis
The analytical results in Section 3.4 illustrate the channels through which changes in
the liquidity ratio parameter pi can affect the steady state return on capital (Rk) and
hence the rest of the economy. However, to gauge the quantitative importance of these
channels we need to either calibrate or estimate the model’s parameters. In this section,
I take the first approach.
3.5.1 Calibration
Table 1 contains a list of the parameters in the model and the values of each in the
baseline calibration.
The financial sector (bank) parameters are set principally by referring to US data. φ and
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pi are set by referring to historical averages in the US data using the Federal Reserve’s H8
data on commercial banks. I calibrate the model to allow a 300 basis point annual spread
between Rf and Rk in steady state, which approximately corresponds to the spread
between US government bonds and US commercial paper. Together, this is sufficient to
calculate 1−ωφ
σ
. The calibration of the remaining financial parameters is more suggestive.
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), σ is set so that banks survive a certain duration - here
15 periods, or just under 4 years- which allows us to recover ω.13
The baseline calibration assumes that χ = 1 and δc = 1% p.a., corresponding to a positive
resource cost from raising deposits and a simple leverage ratio (in which all assets are
weighted equally). These are suggestive and in the experiments below I will vary each
of these by moving them “towards” the neutrality result.
I calibrate the household’s management cost function parameter γh so that household’s
management costs are 1% of steady state GDP in the baseline calibration. kh is calibrated
to hit a target of households owning 2/3 of the capital stock, which corresponds to the
fact that in the US household holding of corporate debt (from the flow of funds) is
approximately twice as large as the stock of commercial bank lending to firms (from the
Federal Reserve Board’s H8 tables).
The remaining parameters in the model are standard given that the model period is
a quarter - namely α, β, δ, and ρz. The consumer’s utility function is taken as log
(which will matter for the dynamics of the model, though not for the steady state). The
government spending parameter g is picked so that the ratio of government purchases to
steady state output in the baseline calibration is 0.2, which corresponds to the share of
government purchases in US GDP.
3.5.2 Numerical comparative statics
Figure 3.1 assesses the degree to which the “crowding-out channel” and the “financial
repression channel” identified in (3.37) matter quantitatively. Three scenarios are con-
sidered:
13Choosing φ, pi and the spread to be consistent with US data requires that the survival horizon for
banks is shorter than that assumed in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
120
Table 3.1: Calibrated parameter values
Parameter Value Description
Banks
χ 1 Risk weight on government debt
δc 1%p.a. Cost of raising deposits
φ 10 Steady state leverage
pi 0.25 Liquidity ratio parameter
σ 0.933 Survival rate of banks
ω 0.003 Governs transfers to new banks
Capital Goods Firms
γk 0.5 Parameter governing adjustment in aggregate capital
Final Goods Firms
α 0.4 Curvature of production function
δ 0.02 Depreciation rate of physical capital
ρz 0.95 AR(1) term in productivity process
Government
ψg 1 Sensitivity of taxes to govt debt
g 0.9870 Government spending
Households
β 0.99 Discount factor
γh 5.2 x 10−4 Scaling parameter in management cost function
k
h 41.7 Physical capital that households can hold costlessly
• The baseline calibration (solid blue line) in which both the “crowding out” and
“financial repression” channels are present (χ = 1, δc = 1%p.a.)
• A second scenario (dotted red line) in which the “crowding out” channel is present,
but the “financial repression” channel is not (χ = 0, δc = 1%p.a.)
• A third scenario (dashed green line) in which the “crowding out” channel is absent,
but the “financial repression” channel is present (χ = 1, δc = 0%p.a.)
The first panel (Rk) is expressed in annualised levels, while the remaining panels (corre-
sponding to N, Y, C) normalise the variable by the value of that variable in the baseline
calibration.
The solid (blue) line shows how each of the endogenous variables (Rk, N, Y, C) changes
as pi varies. A 5 percentage point increase in pi from its baseline calibration leads to
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an 19 basis point (bp) increase in Rk on an annualised basis, a 5% fall in the aggregate
net worth of the banking sector and a 0.8% fall in the steady state level of output and
consumption. It is worth noting that the fall in consumption is roughly the same as the
fall in output, as although Rk implies higher household management costs (for owning
more capital), these are roughly offset by the fall in deposit raising costs for banks. It
is also worth noting that in this suggestive calibration the steady-state output cost of
tigher liquidity regulation is relatively large.
The “crowding out only” scenario (dotted and dashed red line) has sharply different levels
of the endogenous variables to the baseline case. Reducing δc from 1% p.a. to nothing
has a large negative impact on Rk and large positive impact on the level of N, Y and C.
The slope of the red line is somewhat smaller than that of the blue line in three out of
four cases (Rk, Y and C) indicating that the effect of a change in pi would be somewhat
ameliorated by the absence of the financial repression channel. The level of banking
sector net worth is non-monotonic in pi, first increasing and then decreasing, consistent
with the analytical results in the previous section that dN
dpi
is of ambiguous sign when
(χ > 0).
The “financial repression only” scenario (dashed green line) has similar levels of the en-
dogenous variables to the baseline case. However, the slope of the green line is noticeably
flatter than that of either the blue or the red line in three cases (Rk, Y, C). This implies
that the absence of “crowding out” makes the effect of a given change in pi noticeably
smaller on these variables. This suggests that a large part of the effect of a change in pi
is from the “crowding out channel”.
3.5.3 Transition to a new steady state
So far the analytical and numerical analysis has focused on discussion of the steady state
of the model under differing parameters. However, it may also be of interest to focus on
the effect of the transition from one regulatory regime to another. This section analyses
such a transition.
The economy starts in steady state according to one of the three scenarios explained in
the previous section (“baseline” (solid blue), “no financial repression” (dotted and dashed
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Figure 3.1: Effect of varying pi on steady state
Notes: The dotted line refers to a “financial repression” only channel, the dotted-and-
dashed line refers to a “crowding out” only channel and the solid line refers to the com-
bination of the two channels.
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Figure 3.2: Effect of unexpected permanent increase pi from pi = 0.25 to pi = 0.30.
Notes: The percentage point change in the return on capital in each scenario (upper left
panel) has been separated by a vertical intercept for clarity.
red) and “no crowding out” (dashed green)). Then the economy is hit by an unexpected
regulatory change at t=50, in which pi increases from pi = 0.25 to pi = 0.3 and then
remains there forever. These results are calculated by linearising the model around
the terminal steady state, initialising the economy at the steady state corresponding
to the pre-change regime. Figure fig:transition shows the transition of key endogenous
variables.
First, consider the baseline calibration (solid blue line). The increase in pi forces banks to
buy government bonds. As conditions (3.6) and (3.7) hold throughout this experiment,
each individual bank attempts to achieve this by selling physical capital. However,
physical capital can only be sold to households or scrapped (via the capital producing
firms). As there are convex adjustment costs in the adjustment of aggregate capital, this
means that households need to hold more physical capital. In order to induce them to
buy this capital and offset the higher management costs, the price of capital q will jump
down.
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However, this fall in q causes the ex post return on physical capital to become negative for
one period, and hence causes the aggregate net worth of the banking sector to jump down,
further reducing the deposits that banks can gather and hence increasing the amount
of physical capital that banks need to sell. The effect of the increase in pi is therefore
to reduce the sum of bonds and deposits available to the household sector - this leads
to lower deposit interest rates - and temporarily higher consumption - throughout the
initial phase of the transition.
Following the initial period after the regime change, returns on physical capital turn
positive, justifying the household sector’s decision to buy such capital from the banking
sector. Together with the fall in deposit interest rates, this allows the banking sector’s
net worth to recover slightly. However, this rebound is temporary: deposit interest rates
are pinned down by the rate of time preference in the steady state (which does not
change) and the rate of return on capital will also diminish once the initial capital gains
peter out. Under this calibration, net worth will be lower in steady state.
Given all of these changes in the rest of the economy, the behaviour of output is un-
remarkable, declining steadily until reaching the new steady state level (0.8% below
the starting point). However, the speed of the transition is somewhat slow - indeed it
takes 33 quarters for output to decline half of the way to the new steady state. Given
constant Total Factor Productivity and inelastically supplied labour, this decline maps
exactly from the decline in the outstanding capital stock. In turn, this is governed by
the severity of the costs of capital scrapping.
Turning to the other scenarios, a number of points stand out.
• While the profile of output is similar in each case, the combination of each channel
has a smaller effect than each channel separately, in line with the interaction effect
discussed in section 3.4.3.
• In the no “crowding out”, χ = 0 scenario (dashed green) the initial change in pi
does not force a large amount of capital scrapping. This is because banks are able
to raise more deposits in order to satisfy the tighter liquidity requirements, which
they are unable to do under full crowding out. This means that the behaviour
of Rk, N and the other key variables is much smoother than in either scenario in
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which crowding out is present.
• The no “financial repression”, δc = 0 scenario (dashed red) in contrast has a more
severe adjustment process than the baseline when the shock hits - the price of
capital falls further and rebounds more vigorously than in the baseline calibration.
This is because banks initially hold a much higher share of the (larger) total capital
stock (around a half rather than a third in the baseline calibration) and so a given
change in pi forces them to sell more capital - and hence q has to fall further on
impact to induce households to purchase the capital which isn’t scrapped.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper seeks to identify the conditions under which liquidity regulation may have
macroeconomic consequences. To do this, I augment a standard neoclassical growth
model with convex adjustment costs in capital with financial intermediaries (“banks”)
of the style proposed by Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2013). I
identify two principal channels: a “crowding out” channel, and a “financial repression”
channel. Absent each of these channels, the effect of changes in liquidity requirements
of banks on the rest of the economy will be zero.
Of course, the renewed policy and academic focus on financial regulation is to avoid a
repeat of the financial crisis of 2008. The model presented in this paper is only one side of
the story in that it doesn’t allow for such crises and focuses exclusively in understanding
the potential costs of such regulation. Hence this framework cannot be used to study
optimal liquidity regulation as it stands. Incorporating crises into a framework such as
the one presented here is a priority for future research.
That said, the model in this paper does have some implications for the design of financial
regulation. One of the two channels discussed - the “crowding out” channel - comes about
if government debt held by banks counts towards their risk weighted capital requirement.
The Basel III capital regulations has supplemented the Basel-II style “risk-weighted”
capital ratio with a “supplementary” leverage ratio, as well as stipulated a certain level
of liquid asset holding. The model presented here suggests that this is not optimal. The
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model would suggest that any capital ratio should place a risk-weight of zero on assets
that banks are required to hold for liquidity purposes. This would eliminate the “crowding
out” channel illustrated here, and substantially reduce the costs of financial regulation
outside of crisis periods. There is also a case that such a policy would not materially
worsen the position of banks in a crisis, as assets which form part of a “liquidity buffer”
would ordinarily be government securities which are likely to remain liquid throughout
a crisis.
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3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (Conditions under which the bank’s
inequality constraints bind)
Consider the representative bank’s problem. Substituting (3.2) into (3.1) and (3.4) to
eliminate d we get:
max
bbt+i,k
b
t+i ∀i
Et
[ ∞∑
i=1
Λt,t+i(1− σ)σi−1nt+i
]
subject to (∀t):
nt = (R
k
t − R˜dt−1)qt−1kbt−1 + (Rft−1 − R˜dt−1)bbt−1 + R˜dt−1nt−1
qtk
b
t + χb
b
t ≤ φnt
bbt ≥
pi
1− pi (qtk
b
t − nt)
where R˜dt = Rdt +δc is the cost to the bank of raising one unit of deposits. The interesting
case in this model is when both the regulatory capital ratio and liquidity ratio (3.3) and
(3.4) bind. I proceed sequentially to show conditions under which this holds.
First, assume the the liquidity ratio (3.4) doesn’t bind. It is clear from the problem
above that it will be optimal for regulatory capital ratio (3.3) to bind if either:
Et
[
Rkt+1
] ≥ R˜dt (3.42)
or
Et
[
Rft
]
≥ R˜dt and χ > 0 (3.43)
To see why, suppose that (3.3) doesn’t bind and that the first of these conditions holds.
Then the bank will not reduce their expected return by increasing their deposits by a
small amount and using those deposits to buy physical capital k. So if (3.42) holds and
(3.4) is slack then (3.3) binds. A similar logic applies if we substitute (3.43) for (3.42),
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only notice that we also require χ > 0 in this case (as if χ ≤ 0 then increasing b will
never cause the leverage constraint to bind).
However, these conditions are not sufficient if the liquidity ratio (3.4) binds. Assuming
that (3.4) binds, and substituting this and the balance sheet constraint to eliminate b
and d the bank’s problem can be re-written:
max
kbt+i ∀i
Et
[ ∞∑
i=1
Λt,t+i(1− σ)σi−1nt+i
]
subject to (∀t):
nt = (R
k
t − R˜dt−1)qt−1kbt−1 + (Rft−1 − R˜dt−1)
pi
1− pi (qt−1k
b
t−1 − nt−1) + R˜dt−1nt−1
qtk
b
t ≤
φ(1− pi) + piχ
1− pi + piχ nt
Taking the first order condition with respect to kbt+j:
dΠb,t
dkbt+j
= Et
[
Λt,t+j+1(1− σ)σj dnt+j+1
dkbt+j
]
= Et
[
Λt,t+j+1(1− σ)σj[(Rkt+j+1 − R˜dt+j)qt+j + (Rft+j − R˜dt+j)
pi
1− piqt+j]
]
Setting j = 0 it is clear from the above that if the liquidity ratio constraint binds in
period t, then it will be optimal for the regulatory capital ratio to bind if:
(Et
[
Rkt+1
]− R˜dt ) + (Rft − R˜dt ) pi1− pi > 0
(1− pi)Et
[
Rkt+1
]
+ piRft ≥ R˜dt (3.44)
Note that condition (3.44) - is almost sufficient for one of conditions (3.42) or (3.43) to
hold as well. So (3.44) together with (3.42) is sufficient for the regulatory capital ratio
to bind. Another set of sufficient conditions is for (3.44) to hold when χ > 0.
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Now, assume that one of (3.42) or (3.43) holds alongside (3.44), so that the regulatory
capital ratio (3.3) binds. We can then substitute (3.3) and (3.2) into (3.1), and then the
bank’s problem becomes:
max
bbt+i ∀i
Et
[ ∞∑
i=1
Λt,t+i(1− σ)σi−1nt+i
]
subject to (∀t):
nt = (R
k
t − R˜dt−1)(φnt−1 − χbbt−1) + (Rft−1 − R˜dt−1)bbt−1 + R˜dt−1nt−1
bbt(1− pi + piχ) ≥ pi(φ− 1)nt
Then, taking the first order condition with respect to bbt+j:
dΠb,t
dbbt+j
= Et
[
Λt,t+j+1(1− σ)σj dnt+j+1
dbbt+j
]
= Et
[
Λt,t+j+1(1− σ)σj[−χ(Rkt+j+1 − R˜dt+j)) + (Rft+j − R˜dt+j)]
]
Setting j = 0 it is clear from the above that if the regulatory capital ratio constraint
binds in period t, then it is optimal for the bank’s liquidity constraint to bind if:
(Rft − R˜dt )− χ(Et
[
Rkt+1
]− R˜dt )) ≤ 0 (3.45)
as the expected increase in net worth from a marginal increase in deposits will be negative,
so banks will want to hold as few deposits as possible. Given that the leverage constraint
binds then the minimum amount of bonds that can be held is when bbt = pidbt .
Finally, I show that if both (3.44) and (3.45) hold, then this implies either (3.42) or
(3.43) holds as well, if pi ∈ [0, 1] and χ ≥ 0.
First note that if pi ≥ 0 (3.44) implies that either Et
[
Rkt+1
]≥R˜dt and/or Rft≥R˜dt . If the
first of these is true then (3.42) holds. If the second of these is true, (3.43) holds unless
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χ = 0 (as we assumed that χ ∈ [0, 1]).
So if pi ∈ [0, 1], χ ∈ [0, 1] and (3.44) holds then there is only one case in which neither
(3.42) nor (3.43) can hold: when Et
[
Rkt+1
]
< R˜dt < R
f
t and χ = 0. However, χ = 0
together with (3.45) implies that:
R˜dt≥Rft (3.46)
which contradicts R˜dt < R
f
t . Hence, if both (3.44) and (3.45) hold and pi ≥ 0 and χ ≥ 0,
then this is sufficient to imply that either (3.42) or (3.43) holds. In turn, this implies
that (3.44) and (3.45) hold and pi ≥ 0 and χ ≥ 0 always imply that the regulatory capital
ratio (3.3) and the liquidity ratio (3.4) will always bind.
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 (The neutrality result)
Define the household’s holdings of safe assets: ∆t:
∆t = b
h
t + dt (3.47)
Where I have imposed market clearing in the market for deposits (dt = dbt = dht ). We
can use this definition to rewrite market clearing in the market for bonds:
bt = b
b
t + ∆t − dt (3.48)
Using the definition of ∆t, and noting that Rft = Rdt in equilibrium, the consumer’s
budget constraint (3.11) becomes:
ct + ∆t + qtk
h
t + f(k
h
t ) = wt +R
f
t−1∆t−1 +R
k
t qt−1k
h
t−1 − Tt + pibt + pift + pikt (3.49)
We can use the second expression together with the definition of ∆ to eliminate bbt from
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the bank’s constraints (3.1)-(3.4). These become:
nt = R
k
t qt−1k
b
t−1 +R
f
t−1(bt−1 −∆t−1)− δcdt (3.50)
qtk
b
t + bt = nt + ∆t (3.51)
qtk
b
t + χ(bt −∆t + dt) = φnt (3.52)
bt + (1− pi)dt = ∆t (3.53)
Again, assuming that the conditions stipulated in Proposition 1 hold, and so (3.52) and
(3.53) bind.
If χ = δc = 0 then the first three of these don’t contain dt. Re-written, the model
becomes:
Block 1: Banks:
Nt = σ[R
k
t qt−1K
b
t−1 +R
f
t−1(Bt−1 −∆t−1)] + ωφN t−1
qtK
b
t +Bt = Nt + ∆t
qtK
b
t = φNt
pibt = (1− σ)Rkt qt−1Kbt−1 +Rft−1(Bt−1 −∆t−1)]− ωφN t−1
Household:
ct + ∆t + qtk
h
t + f(k
h
t ) = wt +R
f
t−1∆t−1 +R
k
t qt−1k
h
t−1 − Tt + pibt + pikt
1 = Et [Λt,t+1]Rft
1 + f ′(kht ) = Et
[
Λt,t+1R
k
t+1
]
Λt,t+1 =
βu′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
f(kht ) =
γh
2
(kht − k
h
)2
Rkt =
rkt + (1− δ)qt
qt−1
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Firms:
rkt = αzt(k
f
t )
α−1
wt = (1− α)zt(kft )α
Int = (K
b
t +K
h
t )− (Kbt−1 +Kht−1)
It = (K
b
t +K
h
t )− (1− δ)(Kbt−1 +Kht−1)
qt = 1+g(
Int + I
SS
Int−1 + ISS
)+
Int + I
SS
Int−1 + ISS
g′(
Int + I
SS
Int−1 + ISS
)−Et
[
Λt,t+1(
Int+1 + I
SS
Int + I
SS
)2g′(
Int+1 + I
SS
Int + I
SS
)
]
pikt =
(
(qt − 1)Int − g(
Int + I
SS
Int−1 + ISS
)(Int + I
SS)
)
Government:
g +Rft−1Bt−1 = Bt + Tt
Tt = g + ψg(Bt − bSS)
Market Clearing and Aggretation:
Kft = K
b
t−1 +K
h
t−1
Yt = zt(K
f
t )
α
Block 2:
Bt + (1− pi)Dt = ∆t
Bt = B
b
t + ∆t −Dt
∆t = B
h
t +Dt
Notice that the equations listed in block 1 do not contain Bbt , Bht or Dt. Therefore block
1 can be solved irrespective of the values that these variables take. Notice also that block
1 does not contain the parameter pi. Hence changes in pi will alter Bbt , Bht or Dt (in block
2) but will not alter any of the variables in block 1. Hence if χ = δc = 0 then changes in
pi are “neutral” with respect to all variables in the economy.
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3.A.3 Parameters under which the assumptions of Proposition
1 hold in steady state
Expressions for spreads Rk − R˜d and R˜d −Rf are:
R˜d −Rf = δc
Rk − R˜d = 1
ψk
[
1− ωφ
σ
− 1
β
ψb + (
1
β
+ δc)ψ
d
]
− ( 1
β
+ δc)
=
1
ψk
[
1− ωφ
σ
− 1
β
ψb + (
1
β
+ δc)ψ
d − ψk( 1
β
+ δc)
]
=
1
ψk
[
1− ωφ
σ
− 1
β
ψb + (
1
β
+ δc)(ψ
d − ψk)
]
=
1
ψk
[
1− ωφ
σ
− 1
β
(ψk + ψb − ψd) + δc(ψd − ψk)
]
=
1− pi + piχ
φ(1− pi) + piχ
[
1− ωφ
σ
− 1
β
− δc1− piφ+ piχ
1− pi + piχ
]
With our definitions for steady state asset returns and spreads, recall that necessary
conditions for the bank’s two inequality constraints ((3.6) and (3.7)) to be binding (in
the non-stochastic steady state) are:
(1− pi)Rk + piRf ≥ R˜d
χ(Rk − R˜d) ≥ (Rf − R˜d)
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Rearranging the first of these:
(1− pi)(Rk − R˜d) + pi(Rf − R˜d) ≥ 0
(Rk − R˜d) + pi(Rf −Rk) ≥ 0
(Rk − R˜d) ≥ pi
1− pi (R˜
d −Rf )
1− pi + piχ
φ(1− pi) + piχ
[
1− ωφ
σ
− 1
β
− δc1− piφ+ piχ
1− pi + piχ
]
≥ pi
1− piδc
1− ωφ
σ
≥ 1
β
+ δc
[
1− piφ+ piχ
1− pi + piχ +
pi(φ(1− pi) + piχ)
(1− pi)(1− pi + piχ)
]
1− ωφ
σ
≥ 1
β
+ δc
1
1− pi (3.54)
Notice that if χ ≥ 0 and δc ≥ 0, the second condition will be satisfied if Rk − R˜d ≥ 0,
which will be true if:
1− ωφ
σ
≥ 1
β
+ δc
1− pi(φ+ χ)
1− pi(1 + χ) (3.55)
If pi ∈ [0, 1] and φ > 1 then
1− pi(φ+ χ)
1− pi(1 + χ) < 1 ≤
1
1− pi
So A1(i)-(iv) and (3.54) are a sufficient conditions for (3.6) and (3.7) to hold in steady
state.
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Conclusion
This thesis presented three chapters in the broad field of Applied Macroeconomics. The
first chapter argued that firm stock price movements on days on which firms release
financial information (such as quarterly earnings reports) were likely to reflect firm-
specific, rather than aggregate information. I used this in conjunction with an adaptation
of a new econometric technique – identifying Vector Autoregressions (VARs) to recover
estimates of shocks which originate at the firm level, rather than the response of firm
productivity to aggregate or sectoral developments. I then compared how economic
aggregates responded to this measure of firm shocks relative to the measure proposed
in the original paper of Gabaix (2011), and found that this new measure suggests that
these “granular” shocks are somewhat less important for aggregate fluctuations than these
earlier estimates. I also provide evidence that the high share of aggregate fluctuations
“explained” by the earlier measure are likely to come in part from the fact that the very
largest firms are more cyclical than the average firm.
The second chapter examined the empirical claim that GDP is best modelled with a
random walk, and hence a 1% fall in GDP should be associated with a 1% fall in long
term economic forecasts. We show that recoveries are in fact predictable in previous
UK and US recessions using multivariate models, and argue that this is because GDP is
an aggregate of nonstationary and stationary components. This implies that while the
“correct” univariate representation of GDP is nonstationary, richer models can identify
predictable changes where these exist. An implication of the first chapter (and indeed
the third chapter) is that many shocks can matter for aggregate fluctuations and as
such multivariate models may be beneficial for forecasting, even if the latter involves
estimating considerably more parameters.
The final chapter examines the consequences of tightening liquidity regulation on fi-
nancial intermediaries on the aggregate economy. Using a general equilibrium model, I
illustrate two different channels: a “crowding out” channel under which higher liquidity
requirements reduce the capacity of financial intermediaries to intermediate deposits for
a given level of net worth, and a “financial repression” channel through which higher
liquidity requirements erode financial intermediary net worth, and hence raise the cost
of capital for firms, over time. I demonstrate a neutrality result such that in the absence
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of either of these channels liquidity regulation does not raise the cost of capital and
adversely affect aggregate output or consumption. I go on to calibrate the model to US
data and attempt to quantify the effect of higher liquidity requirements on interest rates,
financial sector net worth, output and consumption when one or both of the channels is
present.
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